Author: Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager

Corporate credit turned in a solid performance during the third quarter. Spreads were tighter, with the option adjusted spread on the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Corporate Index opening the quarter at 150 and closing the quarter at 136. Treasuries were almost unchanged on the quarter with the 10yr Treasury opening at 0.66% and closing at 0.68%, but that does not tell the whole story of the volatility that was experienced throughout the period. The 10yr closed as low as 0.51% on August 4th and as high as 0.75% on August 27th with the average coming in at 0.64%. The Corporate Index posted a total return of +1.54% during the quarter with a year-to-date tally of +6.64%. This compares to CAM’s gross quarterly total return of +1.76% and year-to-date gross return of +6.74%.

Investment Grade Bonds – Where is The Value?
We have been at this a long time and the lightning quick risk reversal we have experienced in 2020 is the type of thing that only comes around once every decade or so. Going back to March 20, the Corporate Index closed that day with a year-to-date total return of -10.58%, but quickly rebounded over +17.2% through the end of the third quarter, a period of just over 6 months from the low. In March, the risk reward for corporate credit was very attractive, especially for extremely high quality A-rated credit. The spread on the Corporate Index traded north of 370 during the spring malaise, a level not seen since the financial crisis in early 2009, which is the last time we saw such a tremendous spread rally.

Now that the market has rallied so far so fast, clients are asking about the valuation of IG credit. Some clients are even wondering if it is worth owning IG bonds at all. For most investors, it is important to remember that IG credit is but one part of a well-diversified portfolio. Most of our clients own IG credit as a way to generate income, diversify away from equities or dampen overall portfolio volatility. We think that IG credit is still attractive for a few reasons and that the asset class still has a key part to play in an investor’s overall asset allocation.

Spreads still present opportunity in our view, particularly when looking at the percentage of yield that is comprised of credit spread. Remember that there are two components of yield as a corporate bond investor: the yield of the underlying Treasury at the time of purchase and the corporate credit spread on top of that Treasury yield. For example if the purchase of a security occurred while the 10yr Treasury was 0.70% and the corporate credit spread of the security was trading at 200 basis points then the yield to maturity for that particular bond purchase would be 2.70%. In this case we would calculate the spread component of our overall yield by dividing 200/270bps arriving at a figure of 0.74%, which is very high by historical standards.

As you can see from the above charts, as the yield on the index has fallen, the percentage of yield that is comprised of credit spread has risen. This gives us two items that make us feel reasonably optimistic about the current level of spreads. If the economy is slow to recover from the pandemic, and Treasury rates remain near historical lows for an extended period, then spreads could well grind tighter, to a ratio that is more in line with the historical level of compensation relative to interest rates. On the other hand, if the economy recovers more quickly than the market currently anticipates, then we would expect a gradual increase in interest rates toward pre-pandemic levels. In the “quicker recovery” scenario, because the economy would be improving, then the path of least resistance would be tighter credit spreads which would help to offset rising interest rates. Recall that the spread on the index opened the year at 93 versus 136 at the end of the third quarter, so it is not hard to imagine tighter credit spreads from current levels amid an environment of more robust economic growth.

We are also monitoring several technical tailwinds that could be supportive of credit spreads for the remainder of 2020 and beyond. First, investor demand for corporate credit has been robust in 2020, with over $203 billion in net inflows into high grade funds through the end of the third quarterⁱ. Second, there has been a resurgence in the foreign bid for $USD credit. The Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Negative Yielding Debt Index closed September at -$15.5 trillion, not terribly far from its all-time high of -$17 trillion in August of 2019. Asia is one of the largest buyers of $USD IG credit and overnight Asian buying has been substantially positive every month for the past year and Asian demand was especially large in March, April and May of this yearⁱⁱ. Third and finally, we are looking for supply to slow substantially going forward. 2020 has seen a tidal wave of new issue supply as companies have been keen to meet the aforementioned investor demand with new corporate bond issuance. Through the end of the third quarter, companies had issued a record breaking $1.542 trillion in new debt, +67% ahead of 2019’s paceⁱⁱⁱ. The level of issuance has been so robust that it is unlikely to keep pace going forward as companies have largely completed their liquidity boosting and refinancing endeavors. We expect that companies in certain sectors that are more exposed to the economic slowdown will continue to tap the market for liquidity, but we do not anticipate nearly as much supply from those in less affected sectors. Not only that, but M&A activity is typically a large driver of supply, and it has dwindled to a standstill amid pandemic-related uncertainly. Of 200 IG deals in the 3rd quarter, fewer than 10 were tied to acquisitions bringing the year-to-date total to 20 acquisition-related deals versus 31 over the same time period in 2019^iv. Less new issue supply often creates an environment that is supportive of credit spreads as investors must put their money to work in existing bonds.

Understanding the Risks
Opportunities are not without risk. Some risks loom large, like presidential and congressional elections that are just around the corner that will determine the direction of the country for the next several years. Risks related to the elections are less about the market as a whole and more about individual securities and how they may be impacted by things like tightening or loosening of restrictions related to climate change, financial regulation or changes at the Federal Reserve which could ultimately affect monetary policy. This is where bottom up credit research comes in. Our thorough research process and relatively concentrated portfolio means we are well aware of how current and potential investments might be impacted and we eschew those investments that are exposed to adverse outcomes. As far as the Federal Reserve is concerned, there is little worry about near term changes in policy as Chairman Jerome Powell’s term does not expire until February 2022 and the prevailing thought is that he would be nominated for an additional 4-year term by either presidential candidate.

An emerging risk for passive fixed income investors that has received little attention in our opinion is the increasing duration of the investment grade corporate bond universe. In the past decade, the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate Index has seen its modified duration increase from 6.7 to 8.7 years. Revisiting the concept of duration, all else being equal, if the duration is 8.7 years, then a 100 basis point linear increase in interest rates would yield an 8.7% loss of value for a portfolio invested in the index. Investors in passively managed index portfolios probably do not realize that they are exposed to almost 30% more interest rate risk than they were incurring for the same investment just 10 years ago.

CAM’s modified duration change over the past 10 years was unchanged at 6.2 years and CAM’s duration was 2.5 years shorter than the index at the end of the third quarter. Now, CAM’s duration did exhibit slight fluctuations over the most recent 10 years, but the average during that period was 6.4 years and the range of change over the preceding 10 years was just 0.9, less than half the index range of 2.2 years. The duration gap has clearly grown between CAM’s IG composite and the Index, especially over the past 2 years, as the Index has gradually seen its duration creep higher.

Why has the Corporate Index duration increased? Low interest rates have helped, but much of the change is driven by what we call reverse inquiry. That is, demand from long term institutional investors in the corporate bond space such as pensions, insurance companies and endowments who are extremely thirsty for yield. Company Treasury departments recognized this demand and happily obliged by issuing a higher percentage of longer term debt at rates that were attractive to the company and with enough yield to satiate the institutional investors. Debt maturing in 10 years or more now makes up one-third of the overall IG Index while debt maturing in 20 years or more has grown to 22.4%^v.

Why has CAM’s duration exhibited such little change by comparison? As we have discussed many times before in these commentaries, you know exactly what you are going to get when it comes to our portfolio: intermediate maturities positioned in the 5-10 year portion of the yield curve. Rather than try and “guess” the direction of interest rates we will always position the portfolio in intermediate maturities as it has historically been the best place to be from a risk reward standpoint. For example, the 5/10 Treasury curve at the end of the third quarter was 41 basis points, or about 8.2 basis points of compensation or “roll down” per year earned from holding a 10 year security until the 5 year mark. The 10/30 Treasury curve was 77 basis points, or about 3.8 basis points of compensation per year from the 30 year to the 10 year mark. Thus the 5/10 curve was significantly steeper than the 10/30 curve, and this steepness is one of the reasons CAM favors intermediate maturities. The compensation afforded for the duration risk incurred by extending beyond 10 years does not offer good risk reward in our view. Additionally, there are corporate credit curves that trade on top of these Treasury curves and these corporate curves tell a similar story. At the end of the third quarter the average A2 rated industrial bond traded at a credit spread of +45 to the 5yr, +89 to the 10yr and +125 to the 30yr. Thus the A2 industrial 5/10 curve was 44 basis points while the 10/30 curve was 36 basis points^vi. This illustrates that an investor was being better compensated by moving from a 5yr corporate bond to a 10yr corporate bond than they were by moving from a 10yr corporate bond to a 30yr corporate bond. The major take away from this exercise is that Cincinnati Asset Management will not speculate on interest rates. Instead, we will continue to focus on the intermediate portion of the yield curve where we can add value through our robust bottom up research process and opportunistic credit selection.

Going forward we plan to stick to our script, as disciplined investors of your hard earned capital. We thank you for your interest and support. As always, please do not hesitate to contact us with any questions.

This information is intended solely to report on investment strategies identified by Cincinnati Asset Management. Opinions and estimates offered constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice, as are statements of financial market trends, which are based on current market conditions. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation to buy, hold or sell any financial instrument. Fixed income securities may be sensitive to prevailing interest rates. When rates rise the value generally declines. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Gross of advisory fee performance does not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Our advisory fees are disclosed in Form ADV Part 2A. Accounts managed through brokerage firm programs usually will include additional fees. Returns are calculated monthly in U.S. dollars and include reinvestment of dividends and interest. The index is unmanaged and does not take into account fees, expenses, and transaction costs. It is shown for comparative purposes and is based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable. No representation is made to its accuracy or completeness.

i Wells Fargo Securities, October 1 2020, “Credit Flows: Supply & Demand: September 24-September 30”
ii Credit Suisse, October 2 2020, “CS Credit Strategy Daily Comment (IG September Recap)”
iii Bloomberg, September 30 2020, “IG ANALYSIS US: Mondelez Brings 5th Deal, Month Cracks Top Seven”
iv The Wall Street Journal, October 3 2020, “Credit Markets: Corporate Bond Sales Reach Record”
v Deutsche Bank Research, August 18 2020, “Is Duration Risk The New Credit Risk In IG?”
vi Raymond James, October 2 2020, “Fixed Income Spreads”

What a difference a quarter makes. The investment grade credit market has experienced a reversal of fortune since the dark days of late March, with both spreads and returns rebounding smartly from the levels seen earlier this year.

The resumption of risk appetite led to a sharp tightening in spreads for the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate Index which closed the quarter 122 basis points tighter, moving to an OAS of 150 at the end of June versus 272 at the end of March. Spreads are still well off the lows that we saw in the first quarter of the year when the Corporate Index closed at 93 for several days in a row back in late January. Recall that tighter spreads lead to higher valuations for corporate bonds. Investment grade corporate bonds have also been a beneficiary of the increasing value of Treasuries as lower interest rates have provided a tailwind that has led to higher total returns for investment grade credit. The 10yr Treasury closed 2019 at 1.92%, 0.67% on March 31 and it saw little change in the second quarter, closing at 0.66% on June 30.

The reversal in returns is really something to behold, most especially the speed with which the move has occurred. The total return for the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate Index was as low as -10.58% on March 23, and since that time it has rallied all the way back, and then some, closing the second quarter at a year-to-date total return of +5.02%. This compares to CAM’s year-to-date gross total return of +4.89% for the Investment Grade Strategy. For context, the S&P 500 closed the second quarter with a year-to-date total return of -3.09%. CAM’s gross performance was 54 basis points better than the Corporate Index at the end of the first quarter but now trails the index by 13 basis points year-to-date. CAM’s modest under-performance year-to-date is largely a result of conservative positioning and our structural underweight to the lower rated BAA-portion of the investment grade universe. As is normally the case when markets snap back, the lower quality portion of the Corporate Index tends to outperform, so this caused CAM to give up some ground versus the benchmark.

Portfolio Construction in a Recession
The U.S. officially entered a recession in February according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.i So what does this mean for the way that we manage the portfolio? You may be surprised to find that our behavior has really only changed at the margins. Unlike an ETF or broad market mutual fund, we are looking to construct well diversified portfolios of individual bonds for our clients. Because we build separately managed accounts, our clients will know exactly what they own, in what quantity and its current valuation. No matter where we are in the economic cycle, we will always look to invest in companies that have the ability to manage through a downturn because past experience has taught us that there will always be a recession at some point, and usually when it is least expected. Cyclical sectors and industries tend to get hit the hardest in a recessionary environment and although we have some of this risk in the portfolio we are significantly underweight relative to the Corporate Index. And of course we always operate with a structural underweight on the lower echelon of riskier BAA-rated credit. If anything has changed with our behavior and thinking it is that we are cautious on businesses that have significant exposure to China as we believe that there is risk to U.S.-China trade that could manifest itself at any time.

What’s the Fed been up to?
The Federal Reserve has been quite active in its support of the corporate bond market. The Fed made its first foray into the market by dipping its toe into investment grade credit ETFs in mid-May and by mid-June the Fed had moved on to outright purchases of the individual bonds of 794 companies.ⁱⁱ What may prove to be interesting is where the Fed goes from here. When the original plans were announced on March 23, it was a bleak time for the capital markets. The credit markets were not functioning in a healthy manner and the fixed income ETF model had broken the very first time it faced stress. Since the Fed has made its announcement however, things have improved markedly and the market is back to behaving in a highly efficient manner.

The terms of the Fed’s current program allow it to purchase up to $250 billion of corporate debt on the secondary market. Per the most recent Fed release, it has just over $10bln in corporate bonds on its balance sheet, but the program expires on September 30, at which time the Fed will either hold the bonds it bought, allowing them to mature or it will sell them on the open market. At the current run rate of its purchases, the Fed will get nowhere close to $250 billion as the current rate implies less than $70bln in purchases per year. There are only 63 trading days between July 1 and the expiration date of the current program and it seems unlikely that the Fed’s pace of purchasing will accelerate to the point that it will be able to use almost $240bln of dry powder in just 63 trading days. So one of two things will happen: 1.) The Fed will continue to purchase bonds at its current run rate of less than $300 million per day which would put its balance sheet at approximately $29bln by September 30, less than 12% of its total $250bln capacity or 2.) The Fed will extend the expiration date of the program beyond September 30. We think that the second scenario seems the most likely and that the Fed may in fact not come anywhere close to approaching its $250bln capacity if it does not need to. If there is a spike in volatility then certainly the Fed can buy more but if things remain relatively calm, as they are now, then we believe that the Fed will continue to purchase bonds at or near the current run rate and it will reserve the right to purchase more beyond that only if it needs to do so in order to subdue fear within the markets. The market seems to be operating under the assumption that it is a foregone conclusion that the Fed will use the full amount of its facilities no matter what, but we simply disagree.

Keep on Rollin’
The new issue market has been highly topical this year as 2020 will assuredly smash the all-time issuance record which was $1.3 trillion in 2017. At quarter end, 2020 supply was running 98% ahead of 2019’s pace with $1,176.9bln in new corporate debt having been priced in the first half of the yearⁱⁱⁱ. So you may be wondering why are borrowers, in many cases extremely high quality ones with plenty of liquidity, rushing to borrow more debt? The answer really comes down to uncertainty. If the pandemic gets worse, if we don’t get a vaccine, if growth does not rebound as quickly as expected, these are all the types of questions that companies must ask themselves as they plan for the future. If a large global multinational can afford to borrow today at rates that are reasonably attractive relative to historical standards in order to shore up liquidity amid uncertainty then it is prudent to do so. As for opportunities in the new issue market, they still exist and we are still finding what we consider good value but the times of extraordinary opportunity that we saw in March and April are no longer with us for the time being. It could well be that those opportunities are, as we suspected at the time, the type that only come along once every decade or so.

Second Half Outlook
We believe valuations have recovered to the extent that pockets of volatility in the credit markets may now start to occur with more frequency. Immense demand has largely kept volatility at bay since the end of March, so that is really the wildcard. Individual credits will continue to trade choppy surrounding news on vaccines, virus case counts and the various failures and successes of “re-openings.” From a spread perspective, although spreads are significantly tighter from the widest levels, valuations are reasonably compelling. The spread on the index closed the quarter at an OAS of 150. This compares to the 5yr average of 131, the 10yr average of 141 and the average since 1988 inception of 134. We continue to find compelling opportunities in individual bonds through our bottom up research process.

The Federal Reserve has injected confidence into the fixed income markets. While the actions of the Fed were drastic and unprecedented they were also much needed. Words can hardly describe the extreme malaise that was occurring within the markets over the course of the trading days from March 9 through March 20, up until March 23, the day when the Fed announced its initial plans. A side effect of the confidence that the Fed instilled is that it has created an atmosphere of exuberance and has encouraged more risk taking by market participants. We are at odds with this feeling of euphoria as we believe that this is a great time to take less risk, not more. There are plenty of opportunities to take smart calculated risks by purchasing bonds of companies with solid balance sheets that can navigate an extended downturn in the economy. We have positioned the portfolio accordingly. Not only are we underweight BAA-rated credit but we are also underweight the energy sector and zero weight the leisure, gaming, lodging and restaurant industries, which are becoming correspondingly riskier by the day as the economic uncertainty wears on. We will continue to manage your capital in a prudent manner and we thank you for your continued interest and partnership.

This information is intended solely to report on investment strategies identified by Cincinnati Asset Management. Opinions and estimates offered constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice, as are statements of financial market trends, which are based on current market conditions. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation to buy, hold or sell any financial instrument. Fixed income securities may be sensitive to prevailing interest rates. When rates rise the value generally declines. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Gross of advisory fee performance does not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Our advisory fees are disclosed in Form ADV Part 2A. Accounts managed through brokerage firm programs usually will include additional fees. Returns are calculated monthly in U.S. dollars and include reinvestment of dividends and interest. The index is unmanaged and does not take into account fees, expenses, and transaction costs. It is shown for comparative purposes and is based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable. No representation is made to its accuracy or completeness.

i The Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2020 “Recession in U.S. Began in February, Official Arbiter Says”
ii The Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2020 “Automakers, Technology Firms Are Largest Components of Fed’s Corporate-Bond Purchases”
iii Bloomberg, June 30, 2020 “IG ANALYSIS US: June Ends in Top 6 With July Bringing $100B More”