Investment Grade Quarterly – Page 3 – Cincinnati Asset Management

06 Apr 2020

Insight, Investment Grade Quarterly Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager 0 comment

2020 Q1 Investment Grade Commentary

Investment grade credit just endured one of the most volatile quarters in the history of its existence. Most market participants would agree that only the 2007-2008 global financial crisis can compare to what we have experienced the past month. Spreads were humming along for the first two months of the year before they spiked to levels that had only been seen once since the 1988 inception of the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index.

At its nadir on March 20, the index was down -10.58% year-to-date. For investment grade, in our view, this violent sell off was much less about credit than it was about liquidity and fund flows. Investors pulled a record amount of funds from bond markets over a two week period and the unbridled panic selling coupled with the proliferation of the liquidation of exchange traded funds led to a liquidity vacuumi. As a result there was very little in the way of orderly price discovery. It was perhaps, in our estimation, one of the worst times to sell in the history of the investment grade credit market and this was reflected in the prices of bonds that did sell during this time periodii. The tone in the market shifted substantially on Monday, March 23 as it seemed investors came to terms with the fact that yes, the challenges in front of us are enormous, and the economic data could be quite bad for some time, but humanity will persevere and the world will not end. The shift in tone led to a reversal in risk appetite and the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index finished the quarter with a total return -3.63% while the S&P500 finished with a total return of -19.60%. This compares to CAM’s gross total return of -3.09%. We believe that policy actions by the Federal Reserve, and to a lesser extent, the passage of stimulus by lawmakers did much to restore confidence within the credit markets.

While we are not satisfied that the value of our portfolio declined during the quarter we feel that we are well positioned to weather an economic downturn. The portfolio has a significant structural underweight in BAA-rated credit and it is also underweight the energy sector and zero weight the leisure, gaming, lodging and restaurant industries, which have been particularly hard hit by the cessation of economic activity.

Overwhelming Supply and Outsize Compensation

We frequently speak of new issuance in our commentaries because it is the lifeblood of the corporate credit markets and one of the fundamental ways that fixed income investors acquire new investment opportunities. At CAM, during the invest-up process we will typically populate a new account with 20-30% new issuance as long as concessions from borrowers are attractive and we will also use these opportunities to add exposure for fully invested accounts that have cash available for reinvestment. There are companies constantly borrowing in the corporate bond market to fund capital allocation plans such as property, plant and equipment, liquidity or even shareholder returns. The month of March was one of the most interesting time periods for issuance that we have ever seen in our market and it was really a dichotomy of two halves. In first half of the month the primary market battled volatile treasury rates and record outflows from investment grade funds. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, through Friday, March 13, issuance stood at $37 billion. This was modestly lighter than street expectations to that point as volatility in both spreads and rates had kept issuers at bay. This all changed on March 17, as a myriad of high quality companies elected to take advantage of historically low Treasury rates and push through with issuance even despite historically high credit spreads. The new issue concessions offered during the two week period that would follow were the most attractive that the market has seen in over a decade with many concessions approaching 50-100bps relative to secondary offerings. As a colleague put it, the primary market was being dominated by borrowers who don’t need credit. What we saw were dozens of companies with extremely strong balance sheets borrowing to bolster liquidity in the face of economic uncertainty and they were willing to pay up to do so, but even if spreads where high, the borrowing costs that they were paying were still quite low when viewed through a historical lens. By the time the month had ended, March had rocketed to the top of the leaderboard for the busiest month in the history of the primary market with $259.2 billion in new supply. This was 46% higher than the previous record of $177.7 billionⁱⁱⁱ. Below you will find a table of all of the primary deals that CAM purchased for client accounts during the month of March.

As we turn the page to April we are still finding attractive concessions, but they are not what they were two weeks ago. We expect that volatility in credit spreads will come and go as the world battles through the current crisis but it is entirely possible that we may go a decade or more before we see primary market opportunities like the ones we saw the third and fourth week of March. This is why we constantly preach the need to have a long term strategic view for this asset class. A permanent allocation of capital is ideal in order to take advantage of opportunities like these when they do arise.

Fallen Angels and the Growth of BAA-rated Credit

One of the favorite topics of the financial press is back at the forefront, and for good reason, as it is a legitimate concern that could have a significant impact on the credit markets. In our discussions with investors we tend to find that there is fear surrounding fallen angels as it relates to the investment grade credit market but this is really a high yield problem, and it comes down to the size, depth and liquidity of the high yield universe relative to the investment grade universe. The face value of the investment grade universe is $6.7 trillion while the high yield universe is just over $1.2 trillion. The investment grade BAA-rated universe is over $3.4 trillion, almost three times the size of the
entire high yield universe^iv. According to research by J.P. Morgan, they expect a record $215 billion in high grade debt could fall to high yield in 2020, driven predominantly by the energy and automotive sectors^v. This is not a problem for investment grade in general as these bonds are simply leaving the investment grade universe. It could be a problem for the bondholders of those companies who are downgraded and for high yield investors who are beholden to an index and must purchase the downgraded bonds of investment grade companies whether they like them or not.

As far as CAM’s positioning, we limit our exposure to BAA-rated credit at 30%, while the investment grade universe is more than 50%. Although we are significantly underweight BAA-rated credit we do allow the portfolio to hold split rated credits. Most often this is because it is a credit with just one or two investment grade ratings that is on its way to becoming fully investment grade but sometimes it is a fallen angel that we will continue to hold. There are two reasons we would continue to hold a fallen angel, it could be that we expect a full recovery to investment grade or we could be positioning for a more opportunistic sale. It is important, in our view, to never put the portfolio in a
position where it is a forced seller of a bond as a forced sale usually amounts to an ill-timed sale. We did have one credit in our portfolio get downgraded to fallen angel status during the month of March and we have elected to hold it for the time being as our research indicates that the pricing of the bonds is significantly below the fair market value. We expect more volatility in the BAA-rated portion of investment grade as we navigate economic uncertainty and
we expect our underweight will serve us well from a relative performance perspective.

Fed to the Rescue

The actions of the Federal Reserve have been extremely beneficial to the restoration of confidence in the bond markets. On Monday, March 23 the Fed announced a primary market and a secondary market corporate credit
facility. These actions were in response to turmoil within the commercial paper market and lack of liquidity for bond ETF redemptions. The timing could not have been better as the market ended the previous week with an extremely heavy tone so it was a moment of much needed confidence and the Fed stepped up and delivered exactly what was needed.

Tomorrow and Beyond

Tomorrow brings uncertainty; of that much we are certain. We expect continued volatility, particularly in the energy sector and in lower quality BAA rated credit. We are also optimistic and hopeful. We believe that we will come together, not just as a country, but as a civilization, to defeat the global pandemic. We take comfort in the fact that thousands of the smartest people in the world are currently working on solutions. We do not expect it to be easy and it may even take longer than expected but we know that we will eventually prevail. We believe now that a recession is inevitable so our credit selection is even more discerning than it usually is though we always look to position the portfolio in a manner to ensure it can perform through a full market cycle. A big question on investors’ minds is what will the recovery look like? Our view is that it will probably be less of a “V” and more of a “U” making credit selection paramount as it is important that companies within the portfolio have the balance sheet wherewithal to navigate an extended recovery.

We are sanguine on the current valuation of credit spreads. After closing at a high of 373 on March 23, the OAS on the corporate index ended the quarter at 272. This compares to the 5yr average of 128, the 10yr average of 140 and the average since 1988 inception of 135. Clearly credit has been repriced for the challenges that lie ahead and it has become a “credit pickers” market where a skilled active manager can make a difference.

As always please do not hesitate to call or write us with questions or concerns. We hope that you and your loved ones remain in good health during this difficult time.

This information is intended solely to report on investment strategies identified by Cincinnati Asset Management. Opinions and estimates offered constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice, as are statements of financial market trends, which are based on current market conditions. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation to buy, hold or sell any financial instrument. Fixed income securities may be sensitive to prevailing interest rates. When rates rise the value generally declines. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Gross of advisory fee performance does not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Our advisory fees are disclosed in Form ADV Part 2A. Accounts managed through brokerage firm programs usually will include additional fees. Returns are calculated monthly in U.S. dollars and include reinvestment of dividends and interest. The index is unmanaged and does not take into account fees, expenses, and transaction costs. It is shown for comparative purposes and is based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable. No representation is made to its accuracy or completeness.

The information provided in this report should not be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any particular security. There is no assurance that any securities discussed herein will remain in an account’s portfolio at the time you receive this report or that securities sold have not been repurchased. The securities discussed do not represent an account’s entire portfolio and in the aggregate may represent only a small percentage of an account’s portfolio holdings. It should not be assumed that any of the securities transactions or holdings discussed were or will prove to be profitable, or that the investment decisions we make in the future will be profitable or will equal the investment performance of the securities discussed herein.

i The Financial Times, March 19, 2020 “Asset manager rocked by record bond outflows”

ii Institutional Investor, March 19, 2020 “The corporate bond market is “basically broken” Bank of America says”

iii Bloomberg, April 1, 2020 “IG ANALYSIS US: Record setting March ends with $13 billion bang”

iv ICE BAML Index Data, April 1, 2020

v J.P. Morgan, March 23, 2020 “Fallen angel risk in this crisis”

23 Jan 2020

Insight, Investment Grade Quarterly Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager 0 comment

2019 Q4 Investment Grade Commentary

Investment grade credit ended 2019 on a high note with another quarter of positive total returns. The Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index closed the year at an option adjusted spread of 93, a whopping 22 basis points tighter on the quarter. Treasuries of all stripes sold off during the quarter which mitigated the impact of tighter spreads. The 10yr Treasury closed 2019 at 1.92% after opening the 4th quarter at 1.66%, an increase of 26 basis points. The dichotomy of returns between 2018 and 2019 was stark. While 2018 was a disappointing year with the worst returns for corporate credit in a decade, 2019 was a complete reversal with the best returns in over a decade. For the full year 2019 the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index had a total return of +14.54%. This compares to CAM’s gross total return of +12.78% for the Investment Grade Strategy.

2020 Outlook

As long-time readers know, our specialty at CAM is bottom-up credit research. We seek to invest in the most attractive corporate credit opportunities for our clients at any given time with the goal of generating superior risk adjusted returns. Preservation of capital is always at the forefront of our decision making process, which is one of the reasons we are always structurally underweight the riskier BBB portion of the investment grade credit market. We are not in the businesses of making speculative market bets, such as wagering on the direction of interest rates, but we certainly do have a framework and house view that we use to aid in our decision making process. To that end, we thought it would be helpful to explore some of the themes that we believe could influence the direction of the market in 2020. We expect four distinct factors could impact the fortune of the investment grade corporate credit market in the coming year: issuance, fund flows, foreign demand and fundamentals.

Issuance is Key

Net issuance is a metric that we track to gauge the availability of new investment opportunities. Net issuance is simply the gross amount of new corporate bond issuance less the amount of debt that matures or that is redeemed through call options or tender offers. Both gross and net issuance have been falling since 2017.

The net issuance forecast for 2020 is substantially lower relative to 2019 and some predictions have 2020 net issuance coming in at or near 2012 levels A few of the major investment banks are particularly bearish in their forecasts: Morgan Stanley expects net issuance to be down 22%, Bank of America down 21% and J.P. Morgan down a staggering 36%. i The decline in net issuance could be meaningful for the support of credit spreads. If continued inflows into corporate credit meet substantially lower new issuance this could create a supply-demand imbalance. This imbalance would create an environment that lends support to tighter credit spreads.

Inflows & the Incremental Buyer

IG fund flows have been broadly positive dating back to the beginning of 2016. The only period of sustained outflows from investment grade in the past four years was during the fourth quarter of 2018 which was a time of peak BBB hysteria.ii iii Over $300bln of new money flowed into IG mutual funds, ETFs and total return funds in 2019, according to data compiled by Wells Fargo Securities. The biggest story of 2019 as it relates to flows is the reemergence of the foreign investor, who has become the most important incremental buyer of IG corporates.

Foreign investors were largely quiet in 2018 but in 2019 they poured $114bln into the U.S. IG market through the end of the 3rd quarter.iv Two factors have led to resurgence in foreign demand: First, for those investors that hedge foreign currency, the three Fed rate cuts in 2019 have made hedging much more attractive, as hedging costs are closely tied to short-term rates. Second, and perhaps the larger factor, is the negative yields that foreign investors have faced in their domestic markets. Negative yielding debt reached its zenith in August of 2019 at over $17 trillion. Although it has come down substantially, it remained over $11 trillion at year-end relative to $8 trillion at the beginning of 2019.v

Obtaining precise information on foreign holdings is difficult due to the myriad of ways that this group can invest in the U.S. markets; but what was once a bit player in our market has now become the single largest class of investor, holding an estimated 30-40% of outstanding dollar denominated IG corporate bonds. To put that into perspective the next largest holder is life insurance companies at just over 20%.vi Simply put, inflows are important in order to provide technical support to the credit market, but the real bellwether for flows is the foreign buyer. If foreign money continues to flow into the $USD market, we would expect continued support for credit spreads. However, if foreign investor sentiment sours, it will create a headwind for spreads.

Best of Times & Worst of Times

Although corporate credit performed well in 2019, credit metrics for the index at large have deteriorated and leverage ratios are near all-time highs. We would typically be apt to view such a development through a bearish lens; but the reality is that much of the increase in leverage reflects conscious choices by firms rather than a weakening of business fundamentals. Incentivized by the minimal additional cost incurred for funding a BBB-rated balance sheet relative to an A-rated one, many firms have sacrificed their higher credit ratings to fund priorities such as acquisitions and share repurchases. Investor demand for credit and a prolonged period of historically low interest rates have reduced the financial penalty for moving down the credit spectrum.

Interestingly, a vast majority of BBB-rated debt has remained in the upper notches of that category. According to data compiled by S&P, just 16% of BBB- rated debt is in the lowest BBB minus category while 47% is mid-BBB and 36% is rated BBB+.vii There will surely be some losers in this bunch which makes the BBB story an idiosyncratic one; managers need to choose credits carefully in this space and focus on those which can weather a downturn without putting credit metrics in serious peril. The median GDP forecast for 2020 is 1.8%.viii If this comes to fruition then most IG-rated companies will be able to maintain stable to improving credit metrics for the year which would be another positive for credit spreads. If growth underwhelms, it would not surprise us to see spread widening in more cyclical sectors and in the lower tier of investment grade credit. This is where our individual credit selection factors in heavily.

Risky Business

At over a decade in length, we are in the midst of the longest credit cycle on record yet the current backdrop suggests that it may have more room to run. Investment grade as an asset class is still compelling as part of an overall asset allocation but even the most bullish investor cannot expect 2020 to be a repeat of 2019 as far as returns are concerned. The fact is that there is not much room for error and there are several risks that will continue to loom large on the horizon in 2020.

Private equity companies are starting the year with a record $1.5 trillion in unspent capital. This is not a new story and remarkably this same “record” headline could have been written at the start of each of the last four years!ix Private equity is not bad, per se, but when they become involved with investment grade rated companies it is usually to the detriment of bond investors. Understanding the intricacies of each business in the portfolio and the covenants within each bond indenture can help to avoid a bad outcome.
Policy risk remains high. The Federal Reserve has telegraphed a relatively neutral policy in 2020, which is typically the stance that is taken in an election year, but any deviation from this path could be a shock for markets. The events leading up to the November election and its results both have the ability to effect the direction of credit spreads and the risks are skewed to the downside at current valuations.
Trade disputes have serious potential to derail domestic and global economic growth. The reality is that until uncertainty is removed, the market is subject to volatility and headline risk associated with global trade. The implications at the sector level are particularly severe in some instances and we are positioning the portfolio to mitigate this risk accordingly.

As always please do not hesitate to call or write us with questions or concerns. We will continue to provide the best customer service possible and to prudently manage your portfolios to the best of our ability. Thank you for your partnership and continued interest. We wish you a happy and prosperous new year.

i Bloomberg News, December 30, 2019 “U.S. Corporate Bond Sales to Slow in 2020 With Speed Bumps Ahead”
ii The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2019 “There Have Never Been So Many Bonds That Are Almost Junk”
iii Bloomberg, October 11, 2018 “A $1 Trillion Powder Keg Threatens the Corporate Bond Market”
iv Bloomberg News, December 26, 2019 “The Corporate Bond Market’s $100 Billion Buyer Is Here to Stay”
v Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Negative Yielding Debt Index
vi Federal Reserve System
vii S&P Global Ratings, December 16, 2019 “U.S. Corporate Credit Outlook 2020 Balancing Act”
viii Bloomberg Terminal, January 2, 2020 “US GDP Economic Forecast”
ix Bloomberg News, January 2, 2020 “Private Equity Is Starting 2020 With More Cash Than Ever Before”

15 Oct 2019

Insight, Investment Grade Quarterly Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager 0 comment

2019 Q3 INVESTMENT GRADE QUARTERLY

Investment grade credit markets have continued to enjoy strong performance in 2019, although spreads showed little movement during the third quarter. The Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index closed the quarter at an option adjusted spread of 115, which is exactly where it opened. Coupon income and lower Treasury yields were the driving forces of positive returns during the quarter as the 10yr Treasury finished the quarter at 1.66% after having opened at 2.01%. While Treasuries finished lower, the path was not linear and there was volatility along the way: the 10yr closed at a low of 1.45% on September 3, before rocketing higher to close at 1.89% on September 13, a massive move of 44 basis points over the course of just eight trading days. Corporate bond returns are off to the best start through the first three quarters of any calendar year dating back to 2009 when the US Corporate Index posted a total return of +17.11%. Through the first 9 months of 2019 the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index had a total return of +13.20%. This compares to CAM’s gross total return of +11.69% for the Investment Grade Strategy.

The Primary Market is Back, Bigly

Lower Treasuries, retail fund flows and foreign buyers who were faced with increasingly negative yields in many local markets combined to lead a resurgence in the primary market during the quarter.

September was one for the record books as companies issued $158bln in debt, making it the 3rd largest volume month in the history of the corporate bond market. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, issuance through the end of the third quarter stood at $923.6bln, trailing 2018’s pace by 3.9%.

Portfolio Positioning

While we at CAM are pleased with the year‐to‐date performance of our investment grade strategy, we would like to remind our investors that this performance has occurred over a very short timeframe. We strategically position our clients’ portfolios with a longer term focus and an emphasis on providing a superior risk‐adjusted return over a full market cycle. Amid such a strong start to the year for credit, we would like to illustrate to our investors how we are positioning portfolios for the longer term. While we do not seek to replicate or manage to an index, we do use the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index as a benchmark for the performance of our strategy so this discussion will refer to that index as a tool to compare our relative positioning.

Credit Quality

CAM targets a 30% limitation for BBB exposure, the riskiest portion of the investment grade universe. There is an additional target of maintaining an overall portfolio credit quality rating of at least A3/A‐. The US Corporate Index was 50.39% BBB‐rated at the end of the third quarter with an average rating of A3/Baa1. While this high‐quality bias can cause CAM’s portfolio to underperform during periods of excessive risk taking, it should tend to outperform during periods of market stress. One of the tenets of our strategy is preservation of capital and our BBB‐underweight is helpful in achieving this goal for our investors.

Interest Rate Sensitivity

CAM avoids the fool’s errand of attempting to make tactical bets on the direction of interest rates. Instead we manage interest rate risk by positioning the portfolio in intermediate bonds that range in maturity from 5‐10 years. CAM will occasionally hold a security that is shorter than 5 years or longer than 10, but very rarely does so. By always investing in intermediate maturities, CAM’s seasoned portfolio is more conservatively positioned than the corporate index with a shorter duration and fewer average years to maturity.

Liquidity

Liquidity is always on our minds at CAM. Maintaining an intermediate maturity profile requires that we sell bonds prior to maturity so we must be sure that we will be able to effectively exit positions. CAM targets SEC‐registered securities that have $300 million minimum par amount outstanding.

Additionally CAM attempts to cap its ownership exposure to 5% of any particular issue. By investing in larger more liquid issues and by limiting exposure to any particular issue it makes it easier to achieve best execution when it comes time to sell. CAM’s US Corporate average ownership exposure per issue held at the $869 million end of the third quarter was 0.7%.

Diversification & Industry Sector Limitations
CAM diversifies client accounts by populating individual separately managed accounts with 20‐25 positions. Additionally CAM imposes a 20% exposure limitation at the “sector” level and a 15% limitation at the “industry” level. As an example, “Capital Goods” is at the sector level and beneath that sector there are individual buckets at the industry level, such as Building Materials.

CAM invests in bonds that we believe will add value to the performance of the portfolio. Because CAM does not manage to, or attempt to, replicate an index it does not encounter the problem of over‐diversification or of owning the bonds of an issuer simply because the issuer represents a large weighting within an index.

The Fed Strikes Again, Now What?
The FOMC lowered its target for the Federal Funds Rate twice during the quarter, once at its July meeting and then again in September. The current implied probability of a cut at its meeting at the end of October is around 60% but closer to 75% for the December meeting, as market participants’ views remain mixed on the possibility of further cuts in 2019. We believe that the Fed will abide by its commitment to data dependency. Economic data showing strength or resiliency will result in no further cuts in 2019, but data showing a deteriorating economic picture could mean that more cuts are on the horizon.

In our view, the biggest factor for the performance of risk markets through year end hinges on trade. We believe that the markets are pricing in a China trade resolution over the medium term. If this does not come to fruition or if the U.S. and China become more antagonistic then a negative market reaction becomes more likely. Aside from being positioned more conservatively than the market as a whole, with considerably less BBB exposure and a markedly shorter duration, we believe that we are furthermore better positioned regarding general economic sensitivity as well as, more specifically, Chinese trade exposure.

While the investment grade credit market has performed well, caution still rules the day. We will continue to position portfolios accordingly with an eye toward the longer term. Thank you for entrusting us with the responsibility of helping you to achieve your financial goals.

15 Jul 2019

Insight, Investment Grade Quarterly Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager 0 comment

2019 Q2 INVESTMENT GRADE QUARTERLY

The investment grade credit market continued to perform well during the second quarter of the year. The Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index opened the quarter at an option adjusted spread of 119 and traded as tight as 109 by mid-April before ending the last trading day of June at a spread of 115. Lower quality credit modestly outperformed during the quarter with the BBB-rated portion of the index tightening by 7 basis points relative to the A-rated portion which tightened by 3 basis points. The bigger story of this quarter was lower Treasury yields as the 10yr Treasury finished the quarter 40 basis points lower than where it started. The 10yr ended the first 6 months of 2019 at 2.005% after closing as high as 2.78% in the first few weeks of January. Tighter spreads and lower Treasuries have combined to yield strong performance for investment grade creditors. The Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index posted a total return of +9.85% through the first 6 months of the year. This compares to CAM’s gross return of +9.20% for the Investment Grade Strategy.

When Doves Cry

As longtime clients and readers know, at Cincinnati Asset Management we avoid speculating on the direction of interest rates. Instead we direct our efforts to bottom up credit research, thoroughly studying individual credits and diligently following industry trends, then opportunistically sourcing bonds which can add the most value to the overall portfolio. By positioning the portfolio with intermediate maturities ranging from five to ten years, we mitigate a significant portion of interest rate risk as investors are generally rewarded over medium and longer term time horizons by avoiding tactical positioning and the downside that can come about from being too short or too long with duration bets gone awry. However, while we may be interest rate agnostic, we are not interest rate blind. We would be remiss if we did not comment on the policy actions that we have seen out of the Federal Reserve thus far in 2019. Simply put, the Fed continues to exceed the dovish expectations of the market, a remarkable feat given the extent that the market is pricing in rate cuts, with Fed Funds futures data implying a 100% probability of a rate cut at next FOMC decision on July 31i. We take this as a sign from the Fed that it is extremely concerned with managing a so called “soft landing” when the current economic expansion finally runs out of steam.

The actions of the Fed do not occur in a vacuum and they can have a significant impact on risk assets such as corporate credit. Lower Fed Funds rates coupled with the potential for future slowing economic growth can lead to lower risk-free rates (Treasury rates). When risk-free rates are low, yield starved investors from around the globe turn to large liquid markets in order to satiate their thirst for income thus setting their sights on the corporate credit market. Defaults remain nearly non-existent in the investment grade universe, and when coupled with a still growing economy, this can be a recipe for complacency and a tendency to “reach” for yield. Investors can reach for yield in two ways in IG credit; they can either extend duration or they can take on additional credit risk, but they usually do both. These are ill-advised strategies in our view, especially for investors concerned with capital preservation over a long time horizon. As far as extending duration is concerned, the compensation afforded for extending from a 10yr bond to a 30yr bond typically pales in comparison to the additional interest rate risk that is incurred. What most investors fail to realize is that most duration extensions also contain a significant dose of credit risk. Take the following example with Comcast’s 10yr and 30yr bonds:

An investor receives just 87 basis points of extra compensation for purchasing Comcast’s 30yr bond versus its 10yr bond, and in exchange, the investor takes on an additional 9.4yrs of duration risk. This means that if there is a linear shift in the yield curve and interest rates increase by 100 basis points, the investor in the 30yr bond will capture an additional nine points of downside. However, duration alone does not tell the whole story, as this is not just a story about interest rate risk as much as it is also a story about credit risk. Our hypothetical investor could purchase the risk-free rate instead of the corporate bond, and as you can see from the example above, the spread between the 10 and 30 year Treasury is 53 basis points. If we subtract this 53 basis points from the 87 basis points in spread between the Comcast 10yr and 30yr the difference is 34 basis points. Therefore, 34 basis points is the compensation that the investor receives for the additional credit risk incurred for the purchase of the 30yr Comcast bond in lieu of the 10yr Comcast bond. We like Comcast as an in investment. It is a best-in-class operator in its industry and it generates tremendous free cash flow. But we do not like it enough to lend it money for an additional 20 years in exchange for just 34 basis points of compensation for that credit risk. It simply does not make much sense to us from a risk-reward standpoint.

If you have not yet nodded off from this exercise in corporate credit, the other aforementioned avenue for increasing yield is to simply take on more credit risk by buying shorter maturity bonds of companies with marginal credit metrics. Usually the bonds of companies with marginal credit metrics will offer outsize compensation relative to the bonds of companies with stable or improving credit metrics. There is almost always a reason that the bonds of a marginal company will offer more yield but an investor really has to dig into the numbers and the industry to understand why. Sometimes it may simply be a case of a company that has too much debt or perhaps the business is showing signs of deterioration. Sometimes these investments may well work out but it only takes one or two permanent impairments (downgrade to high yield, structural subordination, default or fraud) to severely impact the performance of a bond portfolio. Taking on more credit risk is not worth it in the current environment in our opinion and is one of the reasons we are significantly structurally underweight the BBB and lower-rated portion of the investment grade universe. We cannot accurately predict when the business cycle will contract but we most assuredly are viewing all new and current investments through a late-cycle lens as we populate the portfolio with companies that have durable business models and the ability to generate free cash flow and comfortably service debt in a recessionary environment.

BBB, Leading the Way

The lowest quality component of the investment grade universe has significantly outperformed the higher quality portion thus far in 2019. The OAS for the index as a whole was 38 basis points tighter through the end of the second quarter. If we segment that by credit quality, the A-rated portion of the index was 30 basis points tighter while the BBB-rated portion of the index was 51 basis points tighter.

Much has been written about the growth of BBB-rated credit, and for good reason. At the end of 2008 it represented 33.15% of the index but at the end of 2018 that figure had swollen to 51.21%. We cap the exposure of our portfolios to BBB-rated credit at 30%, thus we are much more conservatively positioned than the index. We think that this conservative positioning is especially crucial in times like these and we have no intention of increasing our exposure in the near term.

What Happened to Regulators Looking out for the Little Guy?

We typically avoid commenting on regulatory matters but an SEC proposal that was greenlighted in the second quarter has us flummoxed. Regulators recently approved a pilot program that shows a blatant disregard for retail investors and financial advisorsii. Trade disclosure in the corporate bond market has come a very long way in the past 15 years. It is still an over-the-counter market but there was a time in the not too distant past when it was rife with opacity in that there was simply no record of the price at which a bond was traded. The market has slowly but surely evolved and today there is an electronic record of where all corporate bonds trade within 15 minutes of when the trade was completed.

An SEC committee comprised mostly of the largest asset managers and broker dealers on the street voted to enact a 1-year pilot proposal that would roll back much of the progress that has been made with trade disclosureiii. The proposal centers on “block” or large bond trades. The current rule for IG corporate bonds caps trade size dissemination at $5 million but the trade must be posted within 15 minutes. So, as the rule stands today, a trade could have been completed for $50 million of a specific bond issue but unless you are privy to the details you will only know that at least $5 million traded and you will know at what price and you will know this information within 15 minutes of trade completion. This provides some (and we would argue more than adequate) protection to dealers who can buy a large block of a bond from an asset manager and then sell the bond to other asset managers over time without other market participants knowing that the dealer owns a large amount of that particular bond issue. The pilot proposal would increase the dissemination cap to $10 million, and unbelievably, would allow for up to a 48-hour delay (!) before the trade is reported. We oppose the proposal in its entirety as we believe markets are more efficient with more, not less, information, but we take particular issue with the reporting delay. Ironically, the proposal arguably helps us at CAM because it makes the professional management we provide even more valuable. It will not impact our ability to affect best execution because we are in the corporate market all day every day and have many resources and relationships at our disposal to determine where bonds should trade but the proposal is debilitating to the ability of an individual investor or advisor to engage in price discovery.

To understand the potential real-world implications imagine a scenario where Cincinnati Asset Management (CAM) sells $12 million of a particular bond to a dealer at $100. Remember, the trade does not need to be posted for two days. In the interim you, the reader, log into your brokerage account intending to purchase that same bond. You see a price of $105 offered to you, and see no other trades have posted for this particular bond. CAM’s hypothetical $12 million trade has yet to be reported, and you have no way of knowing about it. That $105 price looks fair to you so you purchase the bond. Shortly thereafter the broker-dealer sells the bonds they bought from CAM at $100.25 and both trades are publicly posted. Now you can see that the bond just traded $100-$100.25 and suddenly it appears that you overpaid. But how could you have known if you are not armed with adequate information? This is the proposal in a nutshell – temporarily hiding data from public view for the benefit of a privileged few.

As far as we can tell the only purpose of this proposal is to provide liquidity to large asset managers at the expense of small investors and to enrich the largest broker dealers on the street. Even if it may help us we are still against this proposal as it stands today because it is simply unfair and it is a step back for the corporate credit market. We believe that transparency is necessary for healthy and fully functioning capital markets and that this transparency is the only way to make the market fair to investors of all types, both large and small.

Looking Ahead

As we turn the page to the second half of the year we see more uncertainty ahead. Global trade continues to dominate the headlines and investors are becoming increasingly concerned about economic growth in the Eurozone. As we go to print with this letter the German 10yr Bund is trading at a record low of -0.36%iv. Geopolitical risk too is at the forefront as tensions between the U.S. and Iran remain high. Although the investment grade credit market has performed quite well to start the year we plan to remain conservative in the positioning of our portfolio. We welcome any questions, comments or concerns. Thank you for your continued interest and support.

i Bloomberg, July 1, 2019, 2:08 PM EDT, World Interest Rate Probability (WIRP)
ii FINRA Requests Comment on a Proposed Pilot Program to Study Recommended Changes to Corporate Bond Block Trade Dissemination, April 12, 2019, https://www.finra.org/industry/notices/19-12, Accessed July 1, 2019
iii The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2019, Bond Fight Pits Main Street Against Wall Street
iv CNBC, July 2, 2019, German 10-year bund yield falls to record low, US Treasurys stable amid softer GDP outlook

09 Apr 2019

Insight, Investment Grade Quarterly Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager 0 comment

2019 Q1 Investment Grade Quarterly

The performance of investment grade credit during the opening quarter of the year was in stark contrast to the final quarter of 2018, as risk assets of all stripes performed well during the first quarter. The spread on the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index finished the quarter 34 basis points tighter, after opening the year at a spread of 153 and closing the quarter at a spread of 119. The one-way spread performance of investment grade credit was so pronounced that at one point in the quarter there was a 22 trading day streak where the market failed to close wider from the previous day.i This was a remarkable feat considering that there were just 61 trading days during the quarter. The 10yr Treasury opened the year at 2.68% and closed as high as 2.79% on January 18th, but it finished the quarter substantially lower, at 2.41%. Tighter spreads and lower rates yielded strong performance for investment grade credit and the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index posted a total return of +5.14%. This compares to CAM’s gross total return of +4.95% for the Investment Grade Strategy.

What a Difference Three Months Makes

When the Federal Reserve issued its December FOMC statement the consensus takeaway by the investor community was an expectation of two rate hikes in 2019 with one additional rate hike thereafter, in 2020 or 2021. In any case, the prevailing thought was that we were nearing the end of this tightening cycle with a conclusion to occur over the next two or three years. The Fed then took the market by surprise in late January, with language that was more conservative than expected as FOMC commentary signaled that they were less committed to raising the Federal Funds Rate in 2019. It was at this point that the market perception shifted – with most investors expecting just one rate hike in the latter half of 2019. The March FOMC statement was yet another eyeopener for Mr. Market, with language even more dovish than the decidedly dovish expectations. The consensus view is now murkier than ever. Some market prognosticators are pricing in rate cuts as soon as 2019; but the more conservative view is that barring a material pickup in global growth or domestic inflation we may not see another increase in the federal funds rate for 6-12 months, if at all in this cycle. It is entirely possible that the current tightening cycle has reached its conclusion and that lower rates could be here to stay.

In the days following the March 20th FOMC release, the 10yr Treasury rallied sharply and there were two days during the week of March 25th where the 90-day Treasury bill closed with a slightly higher yield than the 10yr Treasury. This was the first time that this portion of the yield curve has been inverted since August of 2007. Note that this inversion was very brief in nature and as we go to print at the end of the day on April 1st, the 3m/10yr spread is no longer inverted and is now positive sloping at +17 basis points. That is not to say that this portion of the curve will not invert again, because Treasury rates and curves are dynamic in nature and ever changing.

What Has Happened to Corporate Credit Curves?

This is a common question in the conversations we have had with our investors in recent weeks. Corporate markets are entirely different from Treasury markets and behave much more rationally. The defining characteristic of corporate credit curves is that they nearly always have a positive slope. History shows that corporate credit curves typically steepen as Treasury curves get flatter. There are fleeting moments from time to time where corporate credit curves become slightly inverted but these instances are brief in nature and are quickly erased as market participants are quick to take advantage of these opportunities. For example, there may be a motivated seller of Apple 2026 bonds at a level that offers slightly more yield than Apple 2027 bonds. This has nothing to do with dislocation in the Apple credit curve and everything to do with the fact that there is an extremely motivated seller of the bond that is slightly shorter in maturity. Once that seller moves their position, the curve will return to normalcy and you could once again expect to obtain more yield for the purchase of the 2027 bond than you would for the 2026 bond. The following graphic illustrates current 5/10yr corporate credit curves for two widely traded investment grade companies, one A-rated and one BBB-rated. As you can see, corporate credit curves are much steeper than the spread between the 5 and 10yr Treasury.

The Bottom Line

The takeaway from this exercise is that investors will always be afforded extra compensation by extending out the corporate credit curve. At Cincinnati Asset Management, one of the key tenets of our Investment Grade Strategy is that we believe that it is nearly impossible to accurately predict the direction of interest rates over long time horizons. However, throughout economic cycles, we have observed that the 5/10 portion of the curve is usually the sweet spot for investors. Consequently, the vast majority of our client portfolios are positioned from 5 to 10 years to maturity. We will occasionally hold some positions that are shorter than 5 years but we almost never purchase securities longer than 10 years. Further, while an investor can earn more compensation for credit risk by extending out to 30yrs, more often than not this strategy entails excessive duration risk relative to the compensation afforded at the 10yr portion of the curve. Our strategy allows us to mitigate interest rate risk through our intermediate positioning and allows us to focus on managing credit risk through close study and fundamental analysis of the individual companies that populate our portfolios.

Where in the World is the Yield?

The value of negative yielding global debt hit a multiyear low in October of 2018 but it has exploded since, topping $10 trillion as the sun set on the first quarter, the highest level since September 2017.ii

The growth in negative yielding debt has, in some cases prompted foreign investors to pile into the U.S. corporate debt market. A measure of overseas buying in 2019 has more than doubled from a year earlier according to Bank of America Corp.iii Japanese institutions are among the biggest of the foreign investors and the Japanese fiscal year started on April 1, which could lead to even more buying interest in U.S. corporates according to Bank of America. According to data compiled by the Federal Reserve as of the end of 2018, Non-U.S. investors held 28% of outstanding U.S. IG corporate bonds.iv What does this all mean for the U.S. corporate bond market? First, it is safe to assume that foreign demand certainly played a role in the spread tightening that the investment grade credit markets have experienced year to date. Second, although U.S. rates may seem low, when viewed through the lens of global markets, they are actually quite attractive on a relative basis. As long as these relationships exist then there will be continued foreign interest in the U.S. credit markets.

Although our Investment Grade Strategy trailed the index in the first quarter, we are pleased with the conservative positioning of our portfolio. The modest underperformance can largely be explained by our significant underweight in lower quality BBB-rated credit relative to the index. We do not have a crystal ball, but are reasonably confident that we are in the later stages of the credit cycle so we continue to place vigilance at the forefront when it comes to risk management. Please know that we take the responsibility of managing your money very seriously and we thank you for your continued interest and support.

i Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Total Return Value rounded to the nearest hundredth from the close on January 3rd, to the close on February 7th

ii Bloomberg, March 25, 2019, “The $10 Trillion Pool of Negative Debt is Late-Cycle Reckoning”

iii Bloomberg, March 22, 2019, “U.S. Corporate Debt Is on Fire This Year Thanks to Japan”

iv CreditSights, March 8, 2019, “US IG Chart of the Day: Who’s Got the Bonds?”

29 Jan 2019

Insight, Investment Grade Quarterly Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager 0 comment

Q4 2018 Investment Grade Commentary

The final quarter of 2018 was extremely volatile, and no asset class was spared, whether it was corporate credit, Treasuries, commodities or equities. The spread on the corporate index finished the quarter a whopping 47 basis points wider, having opened the quarter at 106 before finishing at 153, the widest level of 2018. Treasury bonds were one of the few positive performing asset classes during the fourth quarter as the 10-year Treasury started the quarter at 3.06%, before finishing the year substantially lower, at 2.69%. The 10-year began 2018 at 2.41%, and it rose as high as 3.24% on November 8, before dropping 58 basis points during the last 8 weeks of the year. On the commodity front, West Texas Crude peaked at $76.41 on October 3, before it endured an elevator-like collapse to $45.41, a 40% move in less than a full quarter. Equities also suffered in the final quarter of 2018. The S&P500 was flirting with year-to-date highs at the beginning of the fourth quarter before losing more than 13.5% of its value in the last quarter of the year. All told, the S&P500 finished the year in the red, with a total return of -4.4%.

2018 was the worst year for corporate credit since 2008, when the corporate index returned -4.94%. For the fourth quarter, the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate Index posted a total return of -0.18%. This compares to CAM’s quarterly gross total return of +0.71%. For the full year 2018, the corporate index total return was -2.51% while CAM’s gross return was -1.44%. CAM outperformed the corporate index for the full year due in part to our cautious stance toward BBB-rated credit and due to our duration, which is shorter relative to the index. BBB-rated credit underperformed A-rated credit in 2018. In late January and early February, the spread between the A-rated portion of the index and the BBB portion was just 43 basis points, but that spread continued to widen throughout the year and especially late in the year. The spread between A-rated and BBB-rated finished the year at 79 basis points as lower rated credit performed especially bad on a relative basis amidst the heightened volatility of year end.

Revisiting BBB Credit, again…

We have written much about the growth in BBB credit and our structural underweight relative to the index. CAM seeks to cap its exposure to BBB-rated credit at 30% while the index was 51.21% BBB at year end 2018. Our underweight is born out of the fact that we are looking to 1.) Position the portfolio in a more conservative manner that targets a high credit quality with at least an A3/A- rating and 2.) While it is our long-established style to position the portfolio conservatively, we do not believe there are currently enough attractive opportunities within the BBB universe that would even warrant a consideration for increased exposure to BBB credit.

The BBB growth storyline has received tremendous focus from the mainstream financial press in recent months. Hardly a day goes by without multiple stories or quips from market commentators. Some have gone as far as to predict that the growth in lower quality investment grade bonds will “trigger the next financial crisis”i or that it is akin to “subprime mortgages in 2007.”ii While we at CAM are extremely cautious with regard to lower quality credit, these statements and headlines are hyperbole in our view. We welcome the increased attention on the bond market from the financial press as we often feel like our market is ignored despite the fact that the total value of outstanding bonds in the U.S. at the end of 2017 was $37.1 trillion while the U.S. domestic equity market capitalization was smaller, at $32.1 trillion. iii What the press and pundits are missing is that, if BBB credit truly hits the skids, it has the potential to be far more damaging to equity holders than it does to bondholders. A few of the reasons an investor may own investment grade corporate bonds as part of their overall asset allocation are for preservation of capital, income generation and most importantly, for diversification away from riskier assets, primarily equities. High quality investment grade corporate bonds are meant to be the ballast of a portfolio. Bondholders are ahead of equity holders and get paid first in the capital structure waterfall. Many BBB-rated companies pay dividends or spend some of their cash flow from operations on share repurchases. Equity holders of these companies should be aware that dividends and share buybacks are levers that can be pulled if necessary in order to pay off debt that the company borrowed from bond holders. To that end, the following chart shows the 10 largest BBB-rated corporate bond issuers in The Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Corporate Index. We calculated how much each of these companies has spent on dividends and share repurchases during the last 12 months through 09/30/2018. If any of these companies were to endure financial stress (and some already are under stress) then we would expect that the majority, if not all of the funds that were previously allocated to dividends and share repurchases would instead be diverted to debt repayment.

CAM currently has exposure to just three of these ten largest BBB issuers. As an active manager that is not beholden to an index, CAM can pick and choose which credits it adds to its portfolio based on risk/reward and valuation relative to credit metrics.

Here are a few examples of how the bondholders of some of these companies were given priority over equity holders in 2018:

•Anheuser-Busch InBev reported disappointing third quarter results that showed a lack of progress in deleveraging the balance sheet stemming from its 2016 acquisition of SAB Miller. In conjunction with its lackluster earnings print, management slashed the dividend by 50% in order to divert more funds toward debt repayment. Anheuser-Busch InBev stock traded off sharply on the news and the stock posted a price change of -38.04% in 2018. Comparatively, one of the most actively traded bonds in the capital structure, ABIBB 3.65% 02/01/2026, posted a total return of -4.74% in 2018, per Bloomberg.

• CVS was once a prolific buyer of its own shares. The company bought back an average of $4bln per year of its own shares over the five year period from 2013-2017, but it did not buy back any shares in 2018. That is because CVS closed on the acquisition of Aetna in 2018, which required it to bring a $40 billion dollar bond deal in March; the largest deal of 2018 and the third largest bond deal of all time. In order to provide an incentive for bondholders to purchase its new debt offering, CVS had to promise that it would divert free cash flow to debt repayment in lieu of share repurchases. Although CVS stock underperformed the S&P500 by more than 3% in 2018, this example is not one of a company that is undergoing stress but a very typical example of a company which undergoes transformational M&A and pauses shareholder rewards in order to repair the balance sheet. Bondholders would have demanded much more compensation from CVS’s new debt deal if it did not halt its share buybacks.

• General Electric’s issues are well publicized and yet another example of cash being diverted toward debt repayment. First, the company slashed its dividend by 50% in November 2017, moving it from $0.24 to $0.12 per share. The second cut came in October 2018, as GE all but eliminated the dividend, moving it to a mere penny per share. GE intermediate bonds, specifically the GE 4.65% 10/17/2021, were performing extremely poorly until mid-November but then they rebounded in price on news of GE’s commitment to debt repayment. The bonds ended the year with a total return of -2.34% per Bloomberg, but this pales in comparison to the performance of GE equity, which finished the year down -56.62%.

The purpose of these examples is not to make the case for bonds over stocks, but to illustrate that BBB-rated companies have levers to pull in order to assist in the repayment of debt. In times of stress, shareholder rewards are typically the first things to go so that cash flow can then be diverted to balance sheet repair. At CAM we feel that an actively managed bond portfolio that picks and chooses BBB credit in a prudent manner can navigate potential landmines in lower quality credit and can selectively choose BBB-rated issues which can aid in outperformance.

As we look toward 2019, we expect continued volatility, especially in lower quality credit, but we think that our portfolio is well positioned due to its high quality bias. Two of our top macroeconomic concerns are Fed policy and the continued economic impact of global trade wars. As far as the Federal Reserve is concerned, it just completed the fourth rate hike of 2018 and the 9th of this tightening cycle. FOMC projections were updated at the December meeting and now show two rate hikes in 2019 and one more after that in 2020 or 2021. This suggests that we are nearing the end of this tightening cycle. What concerns us is that European and Chinese growth are both slowing, and if the U.S. economy slows as well we could see a situation where we have a domestic U.S. economy that is not supportive of further hikes. In other words, there is a risk that the Fed goes too far in its quest to tighten, bringing about a recession, which is negative for risk assets. Corporate bonds in general are more attractive today than their recent historical averages. The spread on the corporate index finished the year at 153, while the three and five year averages were 124 and 125 respectively. Going back to 1988, which was index inception, the average spread on the index was 133. New issue supply could play an outsized role in the spread performance of corporates in 2019. 2018 new issue supply was down 10.7% from 2017 and most investment banks are calling for a further decrease of 5-10% in new issue volume in 2019.iv If this decrease in issuance comes to fruition but is coincident with good demand for IG credit then we could find ourselves in a situation where there is not enough new issue supply to satiate credit investors, which would make for an environment that is very supportive of spreads. In what seems to be a recurring theme in our commentaries, caution will continue to rule day for our portfolio as we head into 2019. We will continue to prudently manage risk within our portfolios and strive for outperformance but not at the sake of taking undue chances by reaching for yield.

We wish you a happy and prosperous new year and we thank you for your business and continued interest.

i USA Today, September 14, 2018, “Ten year after financial crisis: Is corporate debt the next bubble?”

ii DiMartino, Danielle (DiMartinoBooth). “A lot of BBB is toxic. I am watching this more closely than anything. You must put “investment grade” in quotes. This is the sector that has grown to be a $3 trillion monster. Where’s the parallel? Subprime mortgages circa 2007.” November 29, 2018, 9:00 AM. Tweet.

iii SIFMA. September 6, 2018. “SIFMA U.S. Capital Markets Deck.”

iv Bloomberg, January 2, 2019, “High-Grade Bond Sales Hurt by Repatriation, Higher Costs in 2018”

19 Oct 2018

Investment Grade Quarterly Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager 0 comment

Q3 2018 Investment Grade Commentary

The theme of the third quarter was tighter spreads and higher rates. The spread on the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index started the quarter at a year-to-date high of 124, at which point spreads began to march tighter, with the index finishing the quarter at an OAS of 106. The 10yr Treasury started the quarter at 2.86% before finishing at 3.06%. All told, movements in spreads and rates were nearly a wash, as the 18 basis point tightening of the index was not quite enough to offset a 20 basis point rise in the 10yr Treasury. It was a “coupon-like” type of return for corporate bonds during the quarter as the US Corporate Index posted a positive quarterly total return of +0.97%. This compares to CAM’s gross quarterly return of +0.84%. Through the first 9 months of the year, the US Corporate Index has posted a -2.33% total return, while CAM’s gross total return was -2.13%.

There was a flight to quality in the second quarter that was beneficial to CAM, but that trend reversed in the third quarter. Recall that CAM limits itself to a 30% weighting in BBB-rated credit, which is the lower tier of credit quality within the US Corporate Index, while the index itself had a 49.13% weighting in BBB-rated credit at the end of the third quarter. The BBB-rated portion of the index saw its spread tighten 22 basis points during the quarter, which was 5 basis points better than the 17 basis points of tightening that the A-rated portion of the index experienced. Because CAM targets a 70% weighting in higher quality credit, the gross performance of CAM’s portfolio trailed the index by 0.13% during the quarter. We at CAM are perfectly comfortable, even enthused, by our underweight in lower quality credit. CAM was founded in 1989, so we have seen each of the last three credit cycle downturns that have occurred in the past 30 years. We do not know when the current cycle will turn but we do know that we are 10+ years into the expansion period, and we also know that it is inevitable that the cycle will turn at some point. Most of all, we are not currently seeing enough value in the lower tier of investment grade rated credit. As a bottom up manager that is focused on fundamental research, we are currently finding enough good ideas to populate portfolios, but certainly not enough good ideas to approximate the 50% index weighting in BBB-rated credit. We intend to continue to keep our structural underweight on the riskier portions of the investment grade rated universe and we expect that by doing so that our client portfolios will experience lower volatility and higher returns over the long term.

Yields in the riskiest portions of the corporate bond market may not be currently providing enough compensation for investors (see chart below). On September 19th 2018, the spread between the US Corporate Index and US High Yield Index reached a multi-year low of 207 basis points. This means investors were being compensated just an extra 2.07% to own high yield bonds versus investment grade bonds. This differential finished the quarter at 2.10%, not far off the lows. To put this into perspective, the premium afforded by high yield bonds was as high as 6.25% as recently as February 11, 2016. September 2018 marks the lowest spread between high yield and investment grade since July of 2007, which was just prior to the 2007-2008 credit cycle downturn. Again, we feel like there are certainly some risks worth taking in credit, but there are not so many good investments available that the riskiest portions of the corporate bond universe should be trading at near historical lows relative to the much less riskier portions.

The Federal Reserve raised the Fed Funds Target Rate at its September meeting. This marks the 8th increase in the target since the current tightening cycle began in December of 2015. The current implied probability of a Fed rate hike at the December 2018 meeting is 70.1%i. Fed policymaker forecasts envision short term rates at 3.1% by the end of 2019 which implies a hike in December of this year and two additional hikes throughout 2019ii. In our second quarter commentary, we wrote extensively about the flattening of the Treasury curve relative to the steepness of the corporate credit curve. Our positioning has not changed, and we intend to continue to position the portfolio in intermediate maturities that mature within 5-10 years. We believe that, over the medium and longer term, investors are most appropriately compensated for credit risk and interest rate risk by investing in intermediate maturities and that is largely due to the historically reliable steepness of the corporate credit curve. We are also firm in our belief that investors should spend time focusing on risks that can be managed, like credit risk, and spend far less time trying to tactically reallocate their portfolios in response to risks that are fraught with unpredictability, like interest rate risk.

As we look toward the fourth quarter, we expect a relatively sanguine environment for investment grade credit spreads. Companies should continue to reap the benefits of tax reform and a healthy macroeconomic backdrop for the next few quarters. According to data compiled by FactSet, corporate earnings for the second quarter of 2018 featured the highest number of S&P 500 companies reporting earnings per share above consensus estimates since the data first began being tracked in the third quarter of 2008iii. We expect that earnings in the 3rd and 4th quarters will also be strong, but at some point they will be unable to keep pace with the strength of prior quarters and we wonder how investors will respond. The fourth quarter brings with it far more questions than answers. Will the Fed continue its tightening path in December, and if so, can the economy shoulder the burden of Treasury rates that have the potential to go higher? What surprises are in store for the markets regarding global trade

policy? We are in the midst of the longest economic expansion on record – just how long can it continue? We believe that there are plenty of opportunities in investment grade credit, but that now is the time for prudent risk taking and preservation of capital, which are cornerstones of our strategy. Although investment grade credit has seen negative returns for the first 9 months of the year, we support the thesis that the asset class can be part of the bedrock in the framework of an overall asset allocation and can offer attractive risk adjusted returns over medium and longer term time horizons. As the saying goes, “failing to prepare is preparing to fail”, and now is a time for de-risking bond portfolios instead of being unduly concerned with missing out on upside.

i Bloomberg 10/1/2018 3:53pm EDT ii FRED Economic Data, FOMC Summary of Economic Projections for the Fed Funds Rate, Median, 10/1/2018 iii FactSet, September 7th 2018, “Record‐High Percentage of S&P 500 Companies Beat EPS Estimates For Q2”

24 Jul 2018

Insight, Investment Grade Quarterly Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager 0 comment

Q2 2018 Investment Grade Commentary

The second quarter of 2018 brought wider spreads and higher rates, which weighed on the performance of investment grade corporate credit. The Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index opened the quarter at a spread of 109 basis points over Treasuries and it finished the quarter at a spread of 123. Like spreads, Treasury rates were also higher on the quarter, as the 10yr Treasury rose as high as 3.11% on May 17th, before it finished the quarter at 2.86%, which was 0.12% higher than where it opened the quarter. Wider (higher) credit spreads and higher rates both have a negative impact on bond prices, which sometimes cannot fully be offset by the coupon income that is earned from a diversified corporate bond portfolio. The US Corporate Index posted a total return on the quarter of -0.98%. This compares to CAM’s gross return during the second quarter of -0.45%. Looking at YTD numbers, the corporate index posted a total return of -3.27% through the first 6 months of the year while CAM’s gross return was -2.94%. CAM outperformed the index during the quarter due in part to the fact that CAM’s portfolio is always positioned in intermediate maturities that generally range from 5 to 10 years. Treasury rates have moved higher thus far in 2018, and the index has a longer duration than CAM’s portfolio, so interest rates are more of a headwind for the corporate index relative to the intermediate positioning of CAM’s portfolio. Additionally, CAM has benefitted from the higher credit quality of its portfolio relative to the Corporate Index. CAM targets a weighting of 30% for its allocation to BBB-rated corporate credit, which is the riskier portion of the investment grade universe, while the index has a weighting of nearly 50% in BBB-rated credit.

Credit spreads finished the quarter near the widest levels of the year. The tightest level for spreads in 2018 was on Friday, February 2nd. Since that time, there has been significant dispersion in the performance of lower rated credit versus higher rated credit. From February 2nd until the end of the quarter on June 29th, the Corporate Bond Index was 38 basis points wider. During this same time period, single-A rated credit outperformed the index as a whole, as this higher quality portion of the index was 33 basis points wider while the BBB-rated portion of the index was a significant underperformer as it widened by 46 basis points. In other words, since the market low on February 2nd, A-rated credit spreads have outperformed BBB-rated credit spreads by 13 basis points. It is too early to tell if this quality performance dispersion is the making of a trend, but we at CAM are comfortable with our significant underweight to the riskier BBB-rated portion of the index, as we are not seeing enough value in riskier credit currently and believe that the balance between risk and reward is better served by staying overweight higher quality A-rated credit.

The Federal Reserve raised the Fed Funds Target Rate at its June meeting. This marks the 7th increase in the target since the current tightening cycle began in December of 2015. Our clients often ask us what we are doing in response to the Fed’s tightening cycle, which may call for an additional 1-2 rate hikes this year and as many as 3 in 2019. Our response is that we will continue to position the portfolio in intermediate maturities that range from 5-10 years until maturity. Generally speaking, we will allow bonds to roll down the curve until somewhere around the 5-year mark at which time it is often beneficial to sell that 5-year maturity and redeploy the proceeds into a more attractive opportunity that matures in 7-10 years. This cycle tends to repeat itself time and time again. We believe that the intermediate portion of the yield curve is the spot where investors are most appropriately compensated for credit risk and interest rate risk. An investor can earn a higher yield by investing in bonds that mature in 20 or 30 years but the extra compensation afforded for credit risk beyond 10 years is generally benign and an investor would also be taking on much more interest rate risk beyond 10 years. Rather than trying to “guess” the next move in interest rates, we position the portfolio in a predictable maturity band and focus our efforts on analyzing the prospects of individual companies that populate our portfolio.

Much has been written and reported in the financial press with regard to the flattening of the yield curve. The Fed Funds Target Rate has a significant impact on Treasury rates in the 2-5 year range whereas the 7-10 year band of Treasury rates is more dependent on GDP and inflation expectations. The first target rate hike of the current cycle occurred in December of 2015. Since that time and until the end of the second quarter of 2018, the 2-year Treasury has moved 150 basis points higher and the 5-year has gone 100 basis points higher while the 10-year moved just 60 basis points higher. At the end of the second quarter, the 5/10 Treasury curve was 13 basis points, meaning the 10-year Treasury yield was only 13 basis points higher than the 5-year Treasury yield. The 10/30 Treasury curve was just as flat, at 13 basis points. Think of it this way, if you were to invest in a 30-year Treasury instead of a 10-year Treasury, you would only be earning 0.13% more; this hardly seems like very good compensation for a Treasury investor taking on an additional 20 years of maturity. We at CAM are corporate bond investors so it is important to note that, although corporate bonds trade at a spread over Treasuries, the corporate bonds themselves also have credit curves. Corporate bond curves tend to behave more rationally than Treasury curves and investors are typically more fairly compensated for taking on additional years of maturity. Corporate bond curves are organic in nature and ever changing. Higher quality A-rated corporate credits tend to have flatter curves whereas BBB-rated credits will have steeper curves. In the below example, you can see that the investor who extends in Apple or Ford credit receives 40 and 56 basis points of compensation respectively, while the Treasury investor receives only 11 basis points of compensation.

As we turn to the second half the year, we at CAM remain as cautious as ever. The U.S. economic expansion has entered its 10th year, but we must remember that this is a global economy^[1]. While the global economy seems relatively good, growth has been low, and it would not take much to create a recessionary environment where risk assets could fare poorly. There are a number of risks that could impair global growth, most especially a trade conflict that has the potential to erupt into a global trade war. We continue to be selective in our investments, focusing on higher quality credits with sustainable competitive advantages that will allow them to thrive in a variety of economic environments. We are also favoring companies with management teams that have shown financial discipline during a prolonged low interest rate environment, as many management teams have been tempted by low borrowing costs and have piled debt on their balance sheets that could force them to refinance in an environment where borrowing costs are higher. In short, we will continue to add value for our clients by focusing on credit work and populating the portfolio with our best ideas within the realm of corporate credit.

[1] The Wall Street Journal, July 2nd 2018 “Real Time Economics: The U.S. Economic Expansion Enters Its 10th Year… How Much Longer Does It Have?”

09 Apr 2018

Insight, Investment Grade Quarterly Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager 0 comment

Q1 2018 Investment Grade Commentary

The first quarter of 2018 saw credit spread volatility for the first time since early 2016. The Bloomberg Barclays US Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index started the year at a spread of 93 basis points over treasuries and narrowed to 85 on February 2nd which was the tightest level since 2007. From mid‐February onward, spreads finished the quarter wider, increasing to a spread of 109 basis points over treasuries. Recall that, if Treasury rates are held constant, tighter spreads mean bonds have increased in value while wider spreads mean those valuations have decreased. Treasury rates also impacted the performance of corporate bonds in the quarter. The 10yr Treasury started the year at 2.41% and closed as high as 2.95% on February 21st, before it finished the quarter at 2.74%. The combination of credit spreads that were 16 basis points wider and a 33 basis point increase in the 10yr Treasury was too great of a headwind for corporate credit during the quarter, and as a result the Bloomberg Barclays IG Corporate Index posted a negative return of ‐2.32%. This compares to CAM’s gross total return of ‐ 2.50%. By design, relative to the index, CAM is overweight higher quality credit (A‐rated) and underweight lower quality credit (BBB‐rated). Even though the index posted negative returns for the first quarter of 2018, the lower quality portions of the index outperformed the higher quality portions, a trend that has persisted since 2017.

As we have stated in previous commentaries, we expect that, over the longer term, this trend will reverse, and those investors who have favored higher quality and avoided the temptation of “reaching for yield” will be rewarded with outperformance over a longer time horizon.

Generally speaking, the economy has been stable and the backdrop for corporate credit has not deteriorated, yet this was the worst first quarter for corporate credit since 1996, when returns for the index started the year at ‐ 2.58%. So why then did corporate credit perform poorly during the first quarter? First, credit spreads experienced 16 basis points of spread widening, which has a negative impact on performance. Spreads generally go wider because investors are demanding more compensation for credit risk. As you can see from the above chart, a 16 basis point change in spreads is not that significant compared to the ranges that we have seen throughout the last 4 full years. What can impact credit as much or more than spreads is the overall level of interest rates. A 33 basis point move higher in the 10yr Treasury during the quarter, and a 35 basis point move higher in the 5yr Treasury are significant moves given the overall low level of interest rates. A concept called duration comes into play when

discussing these rate moves. The duration of The Investment Grade Corporate Bond Index at the end of March was 7.56. What this means is that, all else being equal, a 100 basis point increase in interest rates would yield a 7.56% drop in the value of a bond portfolio. So, a 50 basis point increase, all else being equal, would yield a 3.78% drop in the value of a bond portfolio. Conversely, a decrease in Treasury rates would increase the value of your bond portfolio. Now, rarely in the real world, do all other things remain equal, but the power of duration was the main driver of poor returns for corporate bonds during the quarter.

At Cincinnati Asset Management, our view on interest rates is that of an agnostic. We consistently position the portfolio in intermediate maturities that are 5 to 10yrs from maturity. Over the medium and longer term time horizons we have observed that this is the ideal place from the standpoint of maximizing the steepness of both the yield curve and the corporate credit curve. A key point to note regarding duration is that it decreases over time. With each passing day, a bond gets closer to its final maturity date, and the bond valuation gets closer to its par value as it approaches maturity – after all, a bond is a contractual agreement where the company that issued the bond has agreed to make a series of semiannual coupon payments to the holder over a specified period of time and it has also agreed to return the par value of the bond at maturity. The 9yr bond that was purchased in your account yesterday will be an 8.5 year bond in 6 months. Someday, it will be a 5yr bond, at which point it likely makes sense to extend from 5yrs back to somewhere in the 7‐10yr portion of the curve, depending on what offers the most attractive valuation at that point in time. We at CAM are extremely confident that we cannot predict where rates will go next. We only know that they will go higher, lower or stay the same. Now, to be sure, we will always select the shortest maturity in that 5‐10yr range that maximizes valuation along the Treasury curve. We have been finding quite a bit of value in 8‐9 year bonds so far in 2018 whereas there are other points in time where 10yr or 7yr bonds make more sense. Where we add the most value for our clients is in the assessment and ongoing monitoring of credit risk. Rates are going to do what they are going to do, but the credit risk associated with individual companies can be studied, researched and managed. When you invest your money with CAM, you are not buying an unmanaged, passive index. Our goal is to populate each client portfolio with the bonds of individual companies that offer the most compelling risk reward at that particular point in time.

As we turn to the second quarter we are seeing what we believe are reasonably compelling valuations in corporate credit. Higher underlying Treasury rates coincident with somewhat wider spreads have served to create some attractive entry points into defensive credits. Some of these same defensive credits were trading at unattractive valuations just a few short months ago when spreads were tighter and rates were lower. We are also finding value in the financial sector, as those valuations are compelling relative to the industrial sector and the economy is set up well for banks and non‐bank financials to report healthy earnings growth which in turn leads to stable and/or improving balance sheets for financial companies. New issue supply in the market is down 11.3% from 2017i but new issue concessions have risen to an average of 11.5bps which is the highest level in over 2 yearsii. A “new issue concession” is the compensation provided to a buyer of a newly issued corporate bond. For example, if a company has a 10yr bond outstanding with a yield of 4%, and it wants to issue a new 10yr bond to finance a plant expansion, then it will have to provide a concession to investors in the form of extra compensation to incentivize investors to purchase the new bond in the primary market instead of the existing bond in the secondary market. If we take the average concession of 11.5bps then the new bond would have a coupon of 4.115% which would make it attractive relative to the existing bond with a coupon of just 4%. Our access to the institutional primary market is one of the ways which we provide value to our client accounts. During the 1st quarter of 2018, about 25% of our purchase volume was new issuance. This is despite the fact that we did not find a single attractive new issue to purchase during the entire month of March. In other words, we remain even more selective than usual when it comes to primary market opportunities, but we believe we will have plenty of chances in the coming months if concessions remain attractive. Ideally, we would like to make 30‐35% of our purchases at attractive levels in the primary market.

A recurring theme for us in our commentaries is the proliferation of lower rated (BBB) credit in the investment grade universe in recent years, as BBB rated debt has increased from 33% to 50% of the index in the past decade. We are pleased to see that this topic is garnering some coverage in the mainstream financial press as the WSJ recently pointed out some of the risks associated with this phenomenon and there are two salient points from a recent article that we believe should give investors pause:

 The growth of BBB rated debt to $2.5 trillion from $1.3 trillion 5 years ago, and
 The yield premium on BBB debt relative to treasuries which stood at 1.34% at the end of March 2018 down from over 2.75% at the beginning of 2016iii.
At CAM we target a weighting of less than 30% for our allocation to the riskier portion of the investment grade universe, which is BBB rated credit. Our concern with the growth in this lower rated portion of the market is the question of what could happen when the current credit cycle runs its course. If we were to experience a shock to the credit markets or a recession, then there is a portion of the corporate bond universe that is rated low‐single‐A that would be at risk of falling to BBB, further increasing the weighting of the risker portion of the market. More than that, there is a risk that many companies, who are rated low‐BBB, or barely investment grade, would be in danger of falling to high yield. The risk profile of a credit that is investment grade versus high yield can be dramatically different over a longer time horizon. According to Moody’s Investors Service annual default study, the 10yr cumulative default rate for Baa rated credit is just under 4% but that cumulative default rate jumps to north of 16% for credits rated Ba (high yield). This is the type of default risk that our investors are simply not bargaining for when they choose to invest in a high quality investment grade rated portfolio that targets an average credit quality of A3/A‐. These are the type of risks that we attempt to mitigate through our bottom up research process and our focus on the higher quality segment of the investment grade credit market.

In closing, we thank you for your business and your continued confidence in managing your portfolios.

This information is intended solely to report on investment strategies identified by Cincinnati Asset Management. Opinions and estimates offered constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice, as are statements of financial market trends, which are based on current market conditions. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation to buy, hold or sell any financial instrument. Fixed income securities may be sensitive to prevailing interest rates. When rates rise the value generally declines. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Gross of advisory fee performance does not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Our advisory fees are disclosed in Form ADV Part 2A. Accounts managed through brokerage firm programs usually will include additional fees. Returns are calculated monthly in U.S. dollars and include reinvestment of dividends and interest. The index is unmanaged and does not take into account fees, expenses, and transaction costs. It is shown for comparative purposes and is based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable. No representation is made to its accuracy or completeness.

i Barclays, April 2nd 2018 “Investment Grade New Issue Supply Analysis”
ii Credit Suisse, April 2nd 2018 “CS Credit Strategy Daily Comment”
iii The Wall Street Journal, April 1st 2018 “The Danger Lurking in a Safe Corner of the Bond Market”

30 Jan 2018

Investment Grade Quarterly, Market Commentary Josh Adams - Portfolio Manager 0 comment

Q4 2017 Investment Grade Commentary

As the fourth quarter of 2017 came to a close, investment grade corporate bond spreads narrowed to the tightest levels of the year, and the lowest since 2007i. The Bloomberg Barclays US IG Corporate Bond Index OAS started the year at 1.22% and finished at 0.93%, which means that, on balance, credit spreads for the index tightened 29 basis points throughout 2017. During 2017, BBB credit spreads tightened more than single‐A spreads by 8 basis points. BBB spreads tightened 36 basis points in 2017, after starting the year at 1.60% and finishing at 1.24%, while A‐rated spreads tightened 28 basis points after starting the year at 1.01% and finishing at 0.73%.

At CAM, our market reconnaissance, observance and experience told us that the insatiable demand for yield and income by both foreign and domestic investors drove the 2017 outperformance of lower quality investment grade credit relative to higher quality investment grade credit. Additionally, the composition of the investment grade universe has changed since the financial crisis ‐‐ in 2007, less than 35% of the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Index was BBB‐rated, while today nearly 50% of said index is BBB‐rated.

Source: Barclays Bank PLC

At CAM, we believe that now, more than ever, it is prudent for us to populate our portfolios with credits that we believe have the durability and financial strength to make it through a downturn in the credit markets. We continue to limit our exposure to BBB‐rated credits at 30%, a significant underweight relative to an IG universe where nearly 50% of credits are BBB‐rated. We are focusing on sectors that we believe will behave more defensively if the credit cycle turns, or if spreads go wider. For example, we would rather forego a modest amount of yield and purchase a single‐A rated regulated utility operating company as opposed to a single‐A industrial with cyclical end markets. We continue to take appropriate risks within the BBB‐rated portion of our portfolios, but only if the individual credit is trading at a level that provides appropriate compensation for the risks. We intend to maintain a significant relative overweight to EETC airline bonds, which are highly rated bonds that are fully secured and offer excess compensation relative to what we are finding elsewhere in the market. As always, we are diligent in screening for and avoiding credits that are at risk for shareholder activism, as we attempt to steer clear of situations where shareholders are rewarded at the expense of bondholders. Simply put, we are loath to change our conservative philosophy against the backdrop of exuberant credit markets. The principal decision makers on our investment grade team measure their experience in decades, not years, so we have seen the cycles come and go. Thus, we believe skepticism and caution are the prudent courses of action, and our portfolios will be positioned accordingly. We believe our core differentiator is our credit research and bottom up process that allows us to populate our portfolios with individual credits with a goal of achieving superior risk adjusted returns over the longer term.

The passage of a sweeping tax bill has generated some inquiry from our clients who would like to know what impact tax reform may have on the credit markets in 2018 and beyond. For investment grade corporate credit, we believe the impact will be relatively muted. There are two issues that could affect credit markets, interest deductibility and repatriation. Interest paid on debt is tax deductible, so as the corporate tax rate is lowered from 35% to 21% it makes debt issuance somewhat less attractive due to a lower overall tax burden. As far as repatriation is concerned, the repatriation tax rate on liquid assets held offshore will fall from 35% to 15.5%, so it is likely that some companies will bring some offshore cash back to the U.S. but we expect only a modest impact on investment grade credit. Of the $1.4 trillion that is held offshore by non‐financial U.S. companies, over 42% of that cash is controlled by just 5 large technology companiesii. While some companies will repatriate cash to pay down debt or to avoid taking on more debt, there will be others that repatriate cash for shareholder rewards and for M&A. Overall, we believe that tax reform will have a very modest impact on investment grade credit and that effect is most likely to be felt in 2018 investment grade new issuance. 2017 was a robust year for corporate bond issuance, with $1.327 trillion in gross issuance, 1% less than the amount of issuance that came to market in 2016iii. Even if tax reform does incent some companies to issue fewer bonds, the M&A pipeline remains robust with pending deals and potential deals, so we at CAM are expecting an issuance figure similar to the last two calendar years.

2018 should be another interesting year at the Federal Reserve. Jerome Powell will be the next Chair of the Federal Reserve, pending a confirmation vote by the full Senate. There is some belief that the Fed may turn more hawkish in 2018, as inflation is slowly creeping back into the picture and the labor market is showing signs of tightening, though wage growth remains relatively subduediv. The Fed continues to target three rate hikes in 2018, but what does this mean for the corporate bond market?v Though the first Fed rate hike of the current cycle occurred in December of 2015, the impact on the 10yr treasury has been relatively muted compared to the front end of the yield curve.

In 2017 we experienced a flattening of the treasury curve. The 5/10 treasury curve started the year at a spread of 51 basis points and ended 2017 at 20 basis points. It is important to note that, even if the treasury curve were to flatten completely, or even invert, there would still be a corporate credit curve that would afford extra compensation to investors for owning 10yr corporate bonds in lieu of 5yr corporate bonds. Corporate bond investors are compensated for two risks; interest rate risk and credit risk. In our experience, investors spend a large portion of their time focusing on the risk they can’t control ‐ interest rate risk, and very little time on the risk that can be controlled – credit risk. We as a manager believe that we can provide the most value in terms of assessing credit risk. In our view, the key to earning a positive return over the long‐term is not dependent on the path of interest rates but a function of: (1) time (a horizon of at least 5 years), (2) an upward sloping yield curve (not only the treasury curve but also the credit curve) ‐ to roll down the yield curve, and (3) avoiding credit events that result in permanent impairment of capital. Understanding and assessing credit risk is at the core of what Cincinnati Asset Management has provided their clients for nearly 29 years.

prevailing interest rates. When rates rise the value generally declines. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Gross of advisory fee performance does not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Our advisory fees are disclosed in Form ADV Part 2A. Accounts managed through brokerage firm programs usually will include additional fees. Returns are calculated monthly in U.S. dollars and include reinvestment of dividends and interest. The index is unmanaged and does not take into account fees, expenses, and transaction costs. It is shown for comparative purposes and is based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable. No representation is made to its accuracy or completeness.

i Bloomberg December 27, 2017 “Surging Demand Sends Investment‐Grade Bond Spread to 2007 Levels”
ii Moody’s Investor Service November 20, 2017 “Corporate cash to rise 5% in 2017; top five cash holders remain tech companies”
iii Bloomberg December 14, 2017 “Investment Grade Issuance Total for December 14, 2017”
iv Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta December 26, 2017 “Wage Growth Tracker”
v Bloomberg Markets December 13, 2017 “Fed Raises Rates, Eyes Three 2018 Hikes as Yellen Era Nears End”

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