Category: High Yield Quarterly

30 Oct 2017

Q3 2017 High Yield Commentary

During the third quarter of 2017, albeit at a slower pace, the High Yield Market continued the positive return trend of the first and second quarters. The Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate High Yield Index return was 1.98% for the third quarter. Positive returns of 2.70% and 2.17% were posted for the first and second quarters of 2017, respectively. Year to date the Index has returned 7.00% which leads many asset classes in the fixed income world. As seen in the first quarter of 2017, the lowest quality cohort of CCC rated securities once again outperformed their higher quality counterparts. The widely discussed reach for yield was once again on display. It is important to note that during 2008 and 2015, the lowest quality cohort of CCC rated securities recorded negative returns of 49.53% and 12.11%, respectively.
We highlight these returns to point out that with outsized positive returns come outsized possible losses, and the volatility of the CCC rated cohort may not be appropriate for many clients’ risk profile and tolerance levels. While the 10 year US Treasury finished the quarter essentially where it started, the Index spread tightened 17 basis points moving from 364 basis points to 347 basis points over Treasuries. While the Index spread continues to grind tighter toward the multi‐year low of 323 basis points reached in 2014, it is still a ways off from the 233 basis points reached in 2007. Each quality cohort participated in the spread tightening as BB rated securities tightened 21 basis points, B rated securities tightened 21 basis points, and CCC rated securities tightened 33 basis points.

The Energy Sector was back to its winning ways of 2016 during the third quarter of 2017. The Independent Energy and Oil Field Services Industries provided the tailwind that the Energy Sector needed after the negative returns posted in the second quarter. The Transportation, Utility, and Industrial Sectors were other top performers. The Communications Sector had a bit of tough time during the quarter as the Wireline Industry was the major drag on performance. Finally, the Consumer Non‐Cyclical Sector was one of the bottom performers as Amazon’s takeover of Whole Foods injected much uncertainty into the future landscape of the Supermarket Industry. Additionally, the Healthcare Industry saw more credit specific weakness in some of the hospital operators.

 

During the third quarter, high yield issuance continued to be fairly robust at $79.8 billion versus $98.7 billion and $77.2 billion during the first and second quarters, respectively. For the third quarter, issuance by broad rating category was essentially divvied up in line by market size of each broad rating category. Year to date issuance stood at $255.6 billion. This pace is very likely to exceed 2016’s total issuance of $286.2 billion.

Even as the Federal Reserve has increased the Federal Funds Target Rate twice this year, yields on intermediate Treasuries have declined with the 10‐year Treasury at 2.33% at September 30, roughly flat from 2.31% at the beginning of the quarter and down from 2.45% at the beginning of the year.

Intermediate term yields more often reflect GDP and expectations for future economic growth and inflation rather than actions taken by the FOMC to adjust the Target Rate. Although the revised second quarter GDP print was 3.1%, the consensus view of most economists suggests a GDP in the 2% range with inflation expectations at or below 2%. It is easy to understand that the “search for yield” that we have witnessed continues and that the high yield market is benefitting from that search.

The most recent FOMC meeting was on September 20th 2017. While the Committee voted to maintain the current Fed Funds Target Rate, they did note that they will initiate a balance sheet normalization program in October i. We expect the program to be a very long and slow process as to best mitigate the risk of riling the markets. The Fed’s current “dot plot” is projecting one hike in December and three additional hikes in 2018. While not all of the projected hikes might come to fruition, the Fed continues to move in the direction of easing up on the accelerator. This is unique relative to the other major central banks. The ECB, BOE, and BOJ have all continued to increase their balance sheets since 2015.

As we have discussed previously, high yield spreads continue to tighten at the same time the restrictive covenant protections contained in the indentures became more relaxed. The weakening of covenant protections has made its way to the loan market as large companies are increasingly able to finance their business with covenant‐lite terms ii. Additionally, weakened covenants are not simply a US phenomenon. International debt deals are increasingly covenant‐lite as well iii. This type of activity is not without consequences. J.Crew Group took advantage of covenants in their indenture to remove collateral value from some creditors. This type of activity is not happening across the board. Some creditors are successful in pushing back against companies while other creditors are not as lucky iv. More and more, a professional manager is needed to select bonds of quality – bonds that compensate the investor for the risks he undertakes in a high yield portfolio.

Being a more conservative asset manager, Cincinnati Asset Management remains significantly underweight CCC and lower rated securities. This underweight contributed to our High Yield Composite performance lagging the return of the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate High Yield Index (1.66% versus 1.98%) during the third quarter. Over the quarter, we continued to be cautious in our investment strategy, maintaining higher cash balances as we become more selective in our security purchases. Given the positive market performance, these cash balances served as a drag on our performance. We were also underweight the Energy Sector which was the best performing sector for the third quarter. On the other hand, some top contributors of our performance were our credit selections across the Capital Goods Sector as well as the Technology Sector.

The Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate High Yield Index ended the third quarter with a yield of 5.45%. This yield is an average that is barbelled by the CCC rated cohort yielding about 8.5% and a BB rated cohort yielding about 4%. These yields are being earned in an environment that is fairly attractive. There has been a significant amount of central bank stimulus. High Yield has displayed a fundamental backdrop that is stable to improving. The default rate of 1.27% is significantly below the historical average and expected to remain low over the next year. Additionally, the default volume during the third quarter was the lowest amount since the fourth quarter of 2013v. Due to the higher income available in the High Yield market, it is still an area of select opportunity relative to other fixed income products.

Over the near term, we plan to be rather selective. Changes to the Affordable Care Act are on the back burner at best, but tax reform is now front and center. Tax reform does have the ability to be a positive factor for the High Yield Market. That said, the continued tightening of credit spreads needs to be carefully monitored to evaluate that the given compensation for the perceived level of risk remains appropriate on a security by security basis. It is important to focus on credit research and buy bonds of corporations that can withstand economic headwinds and also enjoy improved credit metrics in a stable to improving economy. As always, we will continue our search for value and adjust positions as we uncover compelling situations.

This information is intended solely to report on investment strategies identified by Cincinnati Asset Management. Opinions and estimates offered constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice, as are statements of financial market trends, which are based on current market conditions. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation to buy, hold or sell any financial instrument. Fixed income securities may be sensitive to prevailing interest rates. When rates rise the value generally declines. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Gross of advisory fee performance does not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Our advisory fees are disclosed in Form ADV Part 2A. Accounts managed through brokerage firm programs usually will include additional fees. Returns are calculated monthly in U.S. dollars and include reinvestment of dividends and interest. The index is unmanaged and does not take into account fees, expenses, and transaction costs. It is shown for comparative purposes and is based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable. No representation is made to its accuracy or completeness.

i FOMC Statement September 20, 2017
ii Bloomberg September 26, 2017: “That Junk Loan is Now Basically a Junk Bond”
iii Bloomberg September 29,2017: “High Yield Investors Sweat for Return in Europe Sellers Market”
iv Wall Street Journal September 21, 2017: “Deal to Save J.Crew from Bankruptcy Angers High Yield Debt Investors”
v J.P. Morgan October 2, 2017: “Default Monitor”

30 Jul 2017

Q2 2017 High Yield Commentary

The Bloomberg Barclays High Yield Index returned 2.17% during the second quarter of 2017 and 4.93% for the first half of the year, continuing, although at a slower pace, the robust 2016 performance (+17.13%) which was the best since the 2009 recovery performance of 58.21%. Unlike Q1 and all of 2016, the highest rated credit sector (BB rated) outperformed the weaker sectors (i.e., BB rated bonds outperformed B and CCC rated bonds). While the highest rated credits within the universe outperformed the lower quality credits, the entire market was characterized by continued spread tightening – the Index spread tightened from 383 to 364, or 21 basis points over Treasuries and BB rated credits tightened from 252 to 227 or 25 basis points over Treasuries. Spreads are now near their tightest in almost a decade, and while performance during Q2 was positive across all credit subsectors, it is important to note that during 2008 and 2015, the lowest rated credit subsector (CCC) recorded negative returns of 49.53% and 12.11%, respectively. We highlight these returns to point out that with outsized positive returns come outsized possible losses, and the volatility of the CCC credit subsector may not be appropriate for many clients’ risk profile and tolerance levels.

Unlike calendar 2016’s performance that was, in great measure, attributable to the robust recovery of the Energy Sector, Q2 witnessed positive performance by almost all Sectors, led by the Financial Institutions Sector, which was up 3.67%. That Sector accounts for over 9% of the Index, so its performance had a positive impact on the Index performance, but clearly not the significant impact that Energy played during 2016. In fact, Energy posted negative returns of 1.16% for Q2 as oil traded below $50 in the area of $45 per barrel for most of the quarter.

Even as the FED has increased the Federal Funds Target Rate twice this year, yields on intermediate Treasuries have declined with the 10‐year Treasury at 2.31% at June 30, down from 2.39% at the beginning of the quarter and from 2.45% at the beginning of the year. Intermediate term yields more often reflect GDP and expectations for future economic growth rather than actions taken by the FOMC to adjust the Target Rate. The consensus view of most economists suggests a sluggish GDP in the 2% range with inflation expectations at or below 2%. It is easy to understand that the “search for yield” that we have witnessed for several years continues and that the high yield market is benefitting from that search. This search for yield has also been observed in the investment grade universe where the lowest credit rated debt has outperformed the investment grade index as a whole. During Q2, high yield issuance continued to be fairly robust at $76.7BB versus $98.7BB during Q1. Year to date issuance stood at $175.3BB. This pace could see us easily exceeding 2016’s total issuance of $286BB.

Discussed at length during the year by many high yield observers was the fact that, while spreads were tightening, the restrictive covenants contained in the indentures under which the bonds were being issued were becoming more and more “relaxed”. In other words, while investors were searching for yield, issuers were able to negotiate with investors to remove covenants that previously were provided as standard protection for the investor: namely leverage constraints, disposition of assets, etc. More and more, a professional manager is needed to select bonds of quality – bonds that compensate the investor for the risks he undertakes in a high yield portfolio.

Cincinnati Asset Management buys only B3/B‐ and higher rated securities, and, given that the CCC sector underperformed the Index as a whole, it is easily understood that our performance exceeded the Index for the 2nd Quarter (2.24% gross total return vs. 2.17%). During this period, we remained cautious in our investment strategy, maintaining higher than normal cash balances as we become more selective (higher credit quality) in our security purchases. Given the market performance, these cash balances served as a drag on our performance as well.

Further addressing the issue of performance by credit sub-sector, the following table highlights the impact of the performance of the several credit sub‐sectors in the high yield universe on the aggregate high yield performance:

An additional observation: The Index yield for the High Yield Market is 5.62%. Default rates have been low since the Energy sector “crisis” of 2015/16; however, there will always be defaults in the high yield universe. Historically, those defaults have come principally from the CCC and lower subsectors. So pricing needs to reflect that eventuality. With respect to 2017, we continue to be cautious. Many potentially positive factors could favorably impact corporations in the high yield space (changes in the tax code, relaxed and fewer regulations, etc.); however, the impact of changes in trade agreements and the health of the global economy need to be carefully monitored. Defaults, excluding Energy, have remained lower than the long‐term average default rate – a positive sign with respect to the current health of the asset category. On the other hand, the “shrinking” spreads (i.e., implied premium to Treasury bonds) is of concern given that the “search for yield” may have resulted in an overvalued market. The tightening of spreads implies the expectation of a robust recovery in corporate performance.

In this uncertain environment, it is important to focus on credit research and to attempt to buy bonds of corporations that we believe can withstand economic headwinds and can enjoy improved credit metrics in a stable to improving economy.

This information is intended solely to report on investment strategies identified by Cincinnati Asset Management. Opinions and estimates offered constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice, as are statements of financial market trends, which are based on current market conditions. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation to buy, hold or sell any financial instrument. Fixed income securities may be sensitive to prevailing interest rates. When rates rise the value generally declines. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Gross of advisory fee performance does not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Our advisory fees are disclosed in Form ADV Part 2A. Accounts managed through brokerage firm programs usually will include additional fees. Returns are calculated monthly in U.S. dollars and include reinvestment of dividends and interest. The index is unmanaged and does not take into account fees, expenses, and transaction costs. It is shown for comparative purposes and is based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable. No representation is made to its accuracy or completeness.

30 Mar 2017

Q1 2017 High Yield Commentary

The High Yield Market returned 2.70% during the first quarter of 2017, continuing, although at a slower pace, the robust 2016 performance (+17.13%) which was the best since the 2009 recovery performance of 58.21% (Bloomberg Barclays Indices). As was the case for all of 2016, Q1 performance was characterized by outsized performance of the weakest credit sectors within the Index, i.e., the CCC and lower rated credits, which currently account for approximately 15% of the high yield universe. These lowest rated credits returned slightly less than 5% during Q1 (they returned over 30% during 2016). In fact, if we were to exclude the CCC rated credit sub‐sector, the Index would have posted a 1.44% return, lower than our gross return performance of 2.00%. It is important to note that during 2008 and 2015, that lowest rated credit subsector recorded negative returns of 49.53% and 12.11%, respectively. We highlight these returns to point out that with outsized positive returns come outsized possible losses, and the volatility of that credit subsector may not be appropriate for many clients’ risk profile and tolerance levels.

Unlike calendar 2016’s performance that was, in great measure, attributable to the robust recovery of the Energy Sector, Q1 witnessed positive performance by all Sectors, led by the Utility Sector, which was up 4.37%. That Sector accounts for less than 2.76% of the Index, so its performance had a positive impact on the Index performance, but clearly not the significant impact that Energy played during 2016 (The Energy Sector was up over 37% during 2016 and comprised approximately 15% of the Index at year end.) In fact, Energy’s 3.0% return approximated the overall Index as oil traded in a $50‐$55 range for most of the quarter, although it did drop to a low of $47.34 late in the quarter.

The performance of the least credit‐worthy within the high yield universe represented the continuing “search for yield” that we have witnessed for several years as interest rates on Treasury bonds, in general, fell to their lowest levels in a decade during July ‘16 and then increased to a level at year end (2.45%) that was only marginally higher than where it began the year. After the FOMC increased the Federal Funds Target Rate by 25bps in December, the 10‐year Treasury yield declined from 2.60% mid‐December ’16 to 2.39% at March 31. (This search for yield has also been observed in the investment grade universe where the lowest credit rated debt has outperformed the investment grade index as a whole.) The result of this “search” has been the tightening of spreads, i.e. the premium yield of bonds relative to the risk free Treasury rate. At year‐end 2015, the premium yield on BB, B, and CCC rated bonds was 417, 654, and 1,351 basis points, respectively. We ended 2016 with those premia at 270, 382, and 807, respectively; and by March 31, spreads had tightened even more – to 252, 375, and 692, respectively. So, while Treasury rates over the first 3 months of 2017 declined, the premium demanded by the investor for “risk compensation” continued to fall considerably. We make note of this only to inform the investor of the market dynamics surrounding both yield movement (up and down) and premia movement: both impact bond prices.

The demand for yield was met by $98.7BB in new issuance during Q1 2017; total 2016 issuance was $286BB. The Energy and Metal & Mining Sectors were the largest issuers, accounting for 13% and 10% of total volume, respectively. It is interesting to note that the several years prior to 2015, 17‐19% of new issuance came from the lowest rated credits, and that percentage declined dramatically during 2015‐2016, to just over 10% in 2016. However, Q1 2017 saw that percentage increase to almost 16%.

Given that Cincinnati Asset Management does not buy CCC rated securities, it is easily understood that our performance trailed that of the Index for 1st Quarter (2.00% gross total return vs. 2.70%). We have remained cautious in our investment strategy, maintaining higher than normal cash balances as we become more selective (higher credit quality) in our security purchases. Given the market performance, these cash balances served as a drag on our performance as well.

Further addressing the issue of performance by credit sub-sector, the following table highlights the impact of the performance of the several credit sub‐sectors in the high yield universe on the aggregate high yield performance:

With respect to 2017, we continue to be cautious. Many potentially positive factors could favorably impact corporations in the high yield space (changes in the tax code, relaxed and fewer regulations, etc.); however, the impact of changes in trade agreements and the health of the global economy need to be carefully monitored. Defaults, excluding Energy, have remained lower than the long‐term average default rate – a positive sign with respect to the current health of the asset category. On the other hand, the “shrinking” spreads (i.e., premium to Treasury bonds) is of concern given that the “search for yield” may have resulted in an overvalued market. While CCC spreads have tightened considerably, BB and B spreads remain modestly tighter on the year, although they had tightened considerably during 2016. The tightening of spreads implies the expectation of a robust recovery in corporate performance. In this uncertain environment, it is important to focus on credit research and to attempt to buy bonds of corporations that we believe can withstand economic headwinds and can enjoy improved credit metrics in a stable to improving economy.

Cincinnati Asset Management’s High Yield Strategy remains conservatively positioned. The construction of the portfolio is driven by our bottom‐up analysis and our restriction from CCC‐rated securities adds an additional level of conservatism.

This information is intended solely to report on investment strategies identified by Cincinnati Asset Management. Opinions and estimates offered constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice, as are statements of financial market trends, which are based on current market conditions. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation to buy, hold or sell any financial instrument. Fixed income securities may be sensitive to prevailing interest rates. When rates rise the value generally declines. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Gross of advisory fee performance does not reflect the deduction of investment advisory fees. Our advisory fees are disclosed in Form ADV Part 2A. Accounts managed through brokerage firm programs usually will include additional fees. Returns are calculated monthly in U.S. dollars and include reinvestment of dividends and interest. The index is unmanaged and does not take into account fees, expenses, and transaction costs. It is shown for comparative purposes and is based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable. No representation is made to its accuracy or completeness.